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During the last two decades of the twentieth century, several industrialized countries went 
through a process of privatization of many and significant sectors of their economies. Starting 
in the 1980s various policymakers, reflecting a general change in economic thinking, embraced 
the idea that governments should focus on a narrow set of “core” activities (e.g. maintenance 
of public order, defense, market regulation), delegating to the private sector the management of 
other economic areas such as telecommunication and transportation. This trend was shown not 
only by OECD countries but also, and more vigorously, by developing countries and Eastern 
Europe post-communist states transiting to market economies (Recent Trends in Privatization, 
OECD).  
Even though there is no common definition of privatization the OECD defines with that name 
“any material transaction by which the state’s ultimate ownership of corporate entities is 
reduced.” Therefore, the transfer of specific tasks or activities from a state-owned enterprise to 
a private firm cannot be categorized as privatization. In some contexts, privatization appears as 
a disproportionate reaction to the inefficiencies of the public sector (if any) even when 
accompanied by the due reforms. An increasing number of policymakers thus opted for a more 
pragmatic approach, trying to foster the cooperation between the public and the private sector 
without necessarily transferring the ownership of entire corporate entities from the state to 
private investors. This idea materializes in the delegation of specific tasks in the provision of 
public services to the private sector when it has a competitive advantage in their completion. 
Examples of these public services range from more traditional ones, such as transportation, 
energy, and water, to others such as IT services, leisure facilities, military training, and prisons. 
One of the contractual forms that have been widely used by governments to entrust the 
provision of a public service to a private party goes under the name of Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP). This type of arrangement is characterized by the bundling of the different 
tasks inherent to the provision of the service. Examples are financing the project, building the 
infrastructure, operating, and maintaining it. Once bundled the tasks are assigned to a single 
private entity to be carried out. The typical PPP agreement is a long term contract, transfers a 
substantial proportion of risk to the private party, entails a large and irreversible initial 
investment, and once the project is operational it starts generating uncertain streams of cash and 
public benefit flows1. 
 




The literature on PPP contracts has focused on two main issues. The first relates to the presence 
of asymmetries of information that hinders the correct and efficient functioning of these 
agreements. In the delegation process, the private firm has the chance to acquire private 
information or to hide its action from the principal. For this reason, problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard can arise. Several authors have studied these problems using 
concepts from mechanism design and contract theory. Another problem faced by PPP contracts 
is related to the considerable level of uncertainty that surrounds these projects. What emerges 
from the existing literature is that unrealistic demand expectations, cost inflation, changes in 
user preferences, regulatory requirements, weak institutions, environmental corruption, and 
interactions among stakeholders are all factors that have the potential to jeopardize the good 
outcome of the project. In this context, embedding flexibility provisions in the contracts can 
help the parties to promptly react when unexpected changes occur. A strand of literature has 
emphasized the real option nature of these provisions. Various scholars applied mathematical 
methods used in the valuation of financial options to assess the value created by the flexibility 
clauses embedded in the contract. Finally, a third strand of literature has tried to incorporate 
contract design into a real options framework. 
An aspect that instead has not received the due attention in the present literature on PPP is the 
bargaining power of the parties. Most of the scholars discussing PPP contracts allocate all the 
negotiating power to the government and assume it formulates a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the 
agent. Nonetheless, we think that, given the significant amount of risk on the agent’s shoulders, 
it is more appropriate to presume that also the private party will claim some bargaining power 
over at least some of the variables at stake. 
Our contribution departs from the paper by Buso et al. (2020). The authors model the optimal 
design of a PPP agreement considering a moral hazard problem into a real option framework. 
Also, they assume two possible types of agent, one who has negotiating power and another who 
does not. We expand their model by allowing for any possible allocation of the bargaining 
power among the parties. The bargaining power is modeled in two ways (Demougin and Helm, 
2006). In the first set of models, we use a Nash bargaining solution in a two-stage maximization 
problem. We apply to a PPP framework the approach used by Banerjee et. al (2014) in the study 
of a joint venture. In the second, we model the bargaining power of the agent in terms of his 
reservation utility, the higher the latter the greater the former. 
Our main finding from the Nash bargaining solution is that the result by Buso et. al (2020) for 
an agent with no negotiating power is confirmed. Allowing for the bargaining of the parties on 
several combinations of variables, we go back to the optimal contract found by the authors. The 
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main limit of the Nash bargaining model is that it does not allow to draw the principals’ payoff 
as a function of the agent’s bargaining power. In this regard, the model based on the agent’s 
reservation utility is effective. It allows integrating the previous results with an insight on the 
effect of the agent’s negotiating power on the principal’s payoff. As expected, the higher the 
reservation utility of the private firm the lower the government’s payoff. 
The thesis is articulated as follows. The next three chapters provide the theoretical knowledge 
to understand our models and define the perimeter of our contribution. In chapter 4, the 
benchmark model is presented defining the setup and the notation that will be used throughout 
the rest of the work. Chapter 5 presents the Nash bargaining model in its various forms. Chapter 
6 discusses the reservation utility model. The last section concludes. 
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Chapter 1 – PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
1.1 - Public-Private Partnerships: a definition 
The provision of a public service involves a complex array of tasks and, when it comes to 
delegating it to a private entity, the government is faced with a plethora of different contractual 
forms that could define its interaction with the private sector. In the first place, the decision 
between hiring multiple private entities and assign each of them to a specific task or entrust a 
single entity to complete the entire process for the provision of the service emerges. For the 
sake of clarity, the activities needed for the provision of a public service can be narrowed down 
to building the infrastructure and operate the asset as efficiently as possible. In terms of 
contractual arrangement, if the government hires different firms to build and operate the asset 
we have what is called a traditional procurement contract while, when the tasks are bundled and 
assigned to a single entity, the arrangement is known as Public-Private Partnership2. An 
example can be useful for a better understanding. 
Consider a toll road and the social utility that it exerts in terms, for instance, of travel time 
savings. The government, to provide the citizens with this service, does not complete the 
highway on its own but turns to the private sector. Two different contractual alternatives with 
the private counterparty can be taken into consideration. The traditional procurement, where 
the government entrusts two different private entities with different core competencies to build 
the infrastructure and to operate the asset. The PPP, where the public entity contracts with a 
unique counterparty to build and operate the toll road (Hoppe and Schmitz, 2012). 
Besides, Public-Private Partnerships compared to other forms of outsourcing are identified by 
characteristics other than the bundling of different tasks. Auriol and Picard (2009), in their 
paper, assumed outsourcing contracts to be simple in terms of ex-ante arrangements. The initial 
contract specifies just what they called a franchise fee (a transfer from the private entity to the 
government to have access to the monopolistic market) and a statement with which the 
government declares of having no rights or decisional power on the future market outcome and 
structure. However, they recognize another possible interpretation of an outsourcing contract, 
the PPP. It is characterized by a precise description of how payments change depending on 
different contingencies related to output quality and technological uncertainties. The greater 
amount of details, laid down before the investment decision of the firm, considerably increases 
the complexity of the contract. Moreover, in PPPs, the private entity must acquire or build the 
 
2This is not the only characteristic that defines a PPP. Later, a more formal definition will be provided. 
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asset and, in exchange for control and cash-flow rights, to bear a substantial share of the risk 
deriving from the investment. 
A relevant contribution for a clear outline of the main characteristics of a PPP agreement was 
provided by Iossa and Matrimort (2015). They schematize the attributes of a PPP under three 
main components: 
I. Bundling. As anticipated above, the projects for which PPP are used involves a 
multitude of tasks: design, build, finance, and operate. All of them are bundled and 
assigned to the private entity the government is contracting with. Given the differences 
among the activities and the resulting need for diverse competences, the project is 
usually assigned not to a single firm but to what is called a consortium. It is made up of 
a construction company and a facility-management company that are in charge of the 
totality of the project. 
II. Risk transfer. The government, in delegating the provision of the public service to the 
consortium, uses a system of output specifications leaving a great deal of freedom on 
how to achieve the pre-defined goal. Moreover, the compensation of the private is 
related to the cash flows of the project and therefore to its quality. The design, 
construction, and operational risk are thus essentially transferred to the private sector 
party, being it responsible for delivering the service meeting the pre-specified. 
III. Long-term contracts. The typical length of a PPP is between 20 and 35 years. During 
this period, the payments to the private-sector party are typically made by the users of 
the facility or, seldom, by the government. The long-term of PPPs generates another 
source of risk for the consortium, as it is impossible, at the time of the investment, to 
have visibility on the future value of many key variables that affect revenues and costs 
of the project. 
Once defined the main characteristics of the Public-Private Partnerships it is worth saying that, 
in practice, PPPs can take on different structures depending on the final ownership of the asset 
and on the number of tasks that are delegated to the private-sector party. Among the most used 
forms of PPPs, there are the DBFO model (“Design”, “Build”, “Finance”, and “Operate”), the 
BOT (“Build”, “Operate” and “Transfer”) where the ownership of the asset is transferred from 
the consortium to the state at the expiration of the concession, the BOO model (“Build”, “Own”, 





1.2 - Regulation or outsourcing? 
Before discussing what to take into consideration when choosing between a Public-Private 
Partnership and a traditional procurement agreement, it is worth to take a step back and focus 
on the question of how the government should interact with a firm that is in charge of providing 
a public service. The rest of the work, focusing on PPP, will assume the public authority has 
already opted for delegating the service to a private entity. However, the decision on whether 
privatizing the service is upstream the one on how to do it.  For the sake of completeness, we 
discuss some of the academic contributions over the choice of privatizing or not the provision 
of a public service. Being the literature on this theme extremely wide, an exhaustive discussion 
of it is beyond the scope of this study. The goal of the present paragraph is to give a sense to 
the reader of the direction that the literature has taken on this complex topic. 
On the one hand, the government can decide to nationalize the firm that is devoted to providing 
the service, in this case, the firm is state-owned. On the other hand, the government can reach 
a contractual agreement with the firm thus leaving it privately-owned. These two options can 
be analyzed through a parallel between the theory of the firm and the theory of privatization 
(Hart, 2003). 
Consider two firms which have the chance to merge and become vertically integrated, call them 
A and B. Assume the two have a reason for entertaining a long-lasting relationship. For 
instance, firm A is an airplane producer and B is specialized in some aircraft engine 
components. They are faced with two options: stipulate an arms-length contract or merging into 
a single entity. Transferring it to the theory of privatization, firm A can be considered as the 
government while firm B as the firm that is in charge of supplying the society with some good 
or service. Again, A and B can stipulate a contract, or the government can nationalize (buy) the 
firm. The two situations are similar but not identical. Consider, for instance, that the decision 
to privatize or nationalize are generally remarkably political while vertical integration, as 
private entities are involved, resides in the economic sphere. Additionally, the government can 
pursue different goals than a private firm. While the former is concerned with social welfare 
the latter focuses on personal profits (exceptions such as nonprofit and cooperatives make the 
distinction less sharp). Despite some discrepancies, it is undeniable that the issues of vertical 
integration and nationalization are highly comparable (Hart, 2003). 
The literature on the theory of the firm and the one on the theory of privatization, even if 
studying two logically similar problems, have focused on two different sources of inefficiency. 
The first considers the incompleteness of contracts as the main cause of a suboptimal outcome, 
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whereas the latter has assumed a complete contracting environment where inefficiency stems 
from moral hazard and asymmetric information. An interesting insight deriving from the theory 
of the firm is that in a complete contracting environment the structure of ownership does not 
affect the outcome. The owner of the asset does not enjoy any special power since the contract 
describes perfectly, and from the beginning, all the details of the relationship with the other 
party. On the contrary, when the contract is incomplete the ownership structure matters as the 
owner has decisional power on what is not included in the agreement.  
Even if the two theories are related it does not mean that the just mentioned result can be applied 
as it is to the case of privatization. However, looking at the problem from the firm perspective 
helps to understand the trade-off the government is faced with. Take the example of a prison. 
If the government decides to own it, the previous manager of the asset, being now just an 
employee, will not have any incentive to act entrepreneurially, to come up with new ideas, and 
to invest in the asset. Is this a desirable or undesirable effect? To answer, assume that the owner 
can undertake two forms of investments: one that raises the quality of the prison services, and 
another that reduces both operational costs and quality of the prison. If the government does 
not privatize the firm both types of investment are encouraged, comes on its own that the former 
is worth being promoted while the latter is not. Under privatization, instead, none of them will 
receive incentives. Depending on which side of the trade-off is valued the most, the policymaker 
will opt either for privatizing the firm or not. 
Another visual angle on the choice between contracting and privatization can be taken looking 
at the case where the market structure is non-competitive. Consider, as an example, sectors such 
as infrastructure, water, and waste management, public transport, mail services, information, 
and communications technology services that are traditionally characterized by a low level of 
competition. The government can deal with these sectors under two regimes: regulation and 
outsourcing (Auriol and Picard, 2009). Under the regulation, the firm operating in the 
monopolistic market is state-owed and is run by a public manager who has private information 
on the firm’s cost. The government has control and cash flow rights over the firm. It is entitled 
to set investment and production decisions. Nonetheless, control rights come with 
accountability, meaning the government taxes the firm profits but, in case of losses, it must 
subsidize the firm. On the contrary, in the outsourcing regime, an unregulated privately-owned 
firm provides the commodity or the public service. It has control and cash-flow rights and can 
charge a laissez faire monopoly price. However, to have access to the market the monopolistic 
firm can be required to pay a franchise fee to the government and must bear a sunk investment 
to begin production. If the laissez faire regime does not result to be optimal the only instrument 
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the government can use to improve welfare is an ex-post contract. It is called ex-post because 
it can be offered only once the sunk investment has been carried out and some uncertainties 
have been solved. Keep in mind that the monopolist will accept the contract only if it offers a 
payoff greater or equal than the one under the laissez faire regime. 
To sum up, among the advantages of outsourcing we have that it allows the government not to 
subsidize a money-losing company, it yields franchise fees and it relaxes the reduction in 
incentive compatibility constraint. On the other hand, the government has no decisional power 
on the strategy the firm will follow and no rights on the cash flow it will generate if profitable. 
To make the discussion slightly more technical, the benefits from outsourcing can be split into 
two effects, the fiscal effect and the economic surplus effect (Auriol and Picard, 2009). The 
first one is given by the government savings as it does not subsidize a money-losing firm and 
by the revenues from the collection of the franchise fee. The second occurs when production is 
greater under outsourcing than under regulation. A key variable that defines the magnitude of 
these effects is the shadow cost of public funds (Auriol and Picard, 2009). When it is low, 
outsourcing is always preferred. As the shadow cost of public funds rises, outsourcing is 
superior to regulation only if the franchise fee is high enough (Auriol and Picard, 2009). 
These results provide a useful framework to compare outsourcing and Public-Private 
Partnerships to the regulation regime. Several practical conclusions can be drawn. Outsourcing 
is more appropriate when it comes to delivering high technology products in advanced 
economies or to cover low profitability market segments (e.g. postal and transportation services 
in areas with few inhabitants). Finally, in developing countries, it takes the extreme form of 
laissez faire, and it is cost-efficient when applied to low profitability segments of natural 
monopolies, in contrast to money-making segments that are worth to be maintained under 
public control (Auriol and Picard, 2009). 
The choice between outsourcing and regulation is worth to be studied also in a more specific 
setting. Instead of considering a general form of outsourcing, it is possible to focus on a specific 
form of PPP, i.e. the BOT (recall it stands for “Built”, “Operate”, and “Transfer”). Under this 
type of outsourcing regime, the government entrusts a private company to build and operate an 
asset of public interest. However, the ownership of the asset is always in the hands of the 
government and the firm has the right to operate the facility for a pre-defined interval of time. 




The characteristics of the BOT agreement affect the variables in play when studying which 
option is best between outsourcing and regulation. Auriol and Picard (2013) have assumed the 
government and the firm does not share the same information on the operation characteristics 
of the facility. Under this assumption, they have focused on how effective BOT contracts are 
under various degrees of information asymmetries and levels of transferability of the project at 
the end of the concession. While information asymmetries are common to every form of 
outsourcing, the transferability is specific to BOT agreements. Once the concession ends, the 
competencies of the private management are not always easily transferable to the public firm’s 
manager. For instance, in sectors such as water and waste management, who operates the asset 
in the first place can develop considerable expertise and know-how that are difficult to be 
transferred to the new managers. On the contrary, when considering a canal or tunnel 
concession, less advanced managerial knowledge is needed and therefore it is also more 
transferable when the management changes. 
As in the case of a non-competitive market structure, the shadow cost of public funds has a vital 
role in making one alternative superior to the other. Besides, there is a trade-off between the 
cost the government has to afford to build and operate the facility and the loss of consumer 
surplus generated by the higher prices that the concession holder will charge (Auriol and Picard, 
2013).  It has been shown that when the shadow cost of public funds, the business risk, and the 
information asymmetries between the government and the private party increases there are 
better incentives to opt for BOT. When the shadow cost of public funds is high the government 
is more prone to use BOT concession contracts not only in developing countries but also in 
advanced economies. Also, as anticipated above, when the project characteristics ease the 
transferability of the facility at the end of the concession the use of BOT contracts is more 
likely. In conclusion, also the fact that the two parties (public and private) face the same 
uncertainty about the profitability of the project at the time of the concession signature fosters 
the use of BOT agreements (Auriol and Picard, 2013). 
1.3 - Bundling or unbundling tasks 
If the policymaker opts for outsourcing the provision of a public good or service to a private 
entity, a natural question regarding how to define the relationship will follow. For a better 
understanding of the issue, it is useful to remember that the provision of most public services 
requires to perform a complex array of tasks, from building the facility to operate it. In 
traditional procurement, as anticipated above, different tasks are assigned to different entities 
while in PPPs the tasks are bundled. Besides, PPPs transfer risk from the public to the private 
sector and are characterized by a long term. 
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A strand of literature on the topic has discussed tasks bundling as the discrimen to choose 
between PPP and traditional procurement. A recurring argument relates to the presence of 
positive or negative externalities between the building and operation phases. Two cases are 
feasible and documented by practitioners. In the case of a positive externality, investing in a 
high-quality design has a positive impact on operating costs as it allows to provide the service 
more efficiently. Think about a prison, the layout of the rooms and corridors has a vital role in 
meeting certain safety standards. In the case of a negative externality, an innovative design 
increases the operational cost. If the facility differs too much form the standard it will probably 
require the management to re-define certain processes and routines. In the short run, at least, 
the operational costs will be higher. 
Positive and negative externalities become even more relevant when studied under asymmetry 
of information and incomplete contracting. The government, when the effort of the agent is not 
observable (moral hazard), faces a trade-off. It is interested in encouraging the builder to 
improve the quality of the infrastructure and, simultaneously, must provide appropriate 
insurance against adverse shocks on the realized quality. Reducing the incentives on high 
quality allows saving money on insurance. However, if a reduced quality has a negative impact 
on the operating costs the operator of the building will be hurt and will be more demanding for 
the government to make her willing to participate in the agreement. When the eternality is 
positive, bundling building and operation provides an efficient solution to the problem. The 
prospect of reduced operating costs is attractive for the builder who will also operate the facility 
and thus encourages to exert effort to improve the quality of the asset. On the contrary, if the 
externality is negative, merging the builder and the operator is not desirable. The builder (who 
will be the operator) is aware that the higher the quality of the facility the higher the operating 
costs will be and has no incentive to exert effort. For a negative externality, the two tasks are 
better to be split (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Iossa and Martimort 2015). The decision of 
bundling when the externality is positive, besides encouraging the investment on asset quality, 
automatically transfers more risk to the private party. It follows that the induced cost-reducing 
effort comes at the cost of a higher risk premium. In addition, transferring operational risk 
promotes the quality-enhancing effort. This points out how closely risk transfer and bundling 
are related and it is in line with the evidence of more risk transfer and greater risk premiums 
that characterizes PPPs (Iossa and Martimort, 2015). 
To address the choice between bundling and unbundling from a different perspective, one can 
focus on what aspect of the project can be better specified in the contract between the public 
authority and the private party (Hart, 2003). Consider three dates 0, 1, and 2. At 0 the 
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government and the builder sign the agreement, between 0 and 1 the facility is built, and 
between 1 and 2, it is operated either by the same entity who has built it or by a third party. The 
builder can exert two types of effort. The first, i, is called productive as enhances the quality of 
the infrastructure and reduces the operating costs. The second, e, is unproductive. It reduces the 
operating costs together with the quality of the asset. Under unbundling the agreement between 
the parties specifies just the minimum quality level of the asset. The builder does not internalize 
the cost-reducing externality related to i and has no incentive to build a facility qualitatively 
higher than the minimum contractual level (only effort e is exerted). It will build the cheapest 
facility possible. In the case of bundling, the contract specifies the quality of the service. Here 
the agent will exert effort i together with effort e since it realizes that an increase in quality 
induces operational savings in the second period (between 1 and 2). In conclusion traditional 
procurement (unbundling) is preferable if the quality of the building can be effectively specified 
while the one of the service cannot be. Here, underinvestment in i under traditional procurement 
is not a serious issue while overinvestment in e under PPP could be. Differently, PPPs are 
desirable when the quality of the service can be effectively specified while the one of the 
building cannot be. Here, underinvestment in i under traditional procurement could be a serious 
issue, whereas overinvestment in e under PPP is not (Hart, 2003). 
1.4 - Asymmetry of information  
Many authors have rightfully described the interaction between the parties of a Public-Private 
Partnership as a Principal-Agent (P-A) problem. A key issue in the relationship between the 
government and the firm, to which the provision of the public service is delegated, is the 
asymmetry of information and the inefficiencies that can follow. Delegation in PPPs can be 
justified either by the benefits in terms of increasing project returns coming from the efficient 
division of tasks, by the principal’s inability or lack of time to carry out the project on her own, 
and by the principal’s limited rationality when facing problems beyond a certain level of 
complexity. The literature on P-A problems has pointed out that inefficiencies arise because of 
two types of agency problems to which any issue in delegation can be led back to adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection arises every time in the delegation process the agent can acquire some private 
information not available to the principal. For this reason, it is also defined as a problem of 
hidden information. In PPP, the private company can be better informed than the government 
on several aspects related to the project. Before the contract signature, the firm can have better 
access to information on the building costs of the infrastructure. During the building phase, it 
is likely that the builder will acquire information on the operational costs of the service. Also, 
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the constructor has better knowledge of how expensive would be to modify the infrastructure 
if new needs emerge in the operation phase. In any of these cases, the additional information in 
the hands of the agent has some vital implications for the design of the contract to be signed by 
the parties. For an efficient use of economic resources, the principal needs to extract the agent’s 
private information. To do so, she must afford an additional cost defined as information rent 
that adds up to the typical technological cost required to carry out the investment. The greater 
expenditure incurred by the government to smooth the asymmetry of information distorts the 
contractual equilibrium between the two parties, it deviates from the optimal that would be 
achieved under symmetric information. 
Moral hazard arises when the designated firm for the provision of the service has the chance to 
deliberately choose a course of action that will materially affect the outcome of the project. 
Delegating the task, the principal loses any ability to control the agent’s action either if it is not 
observable or if it cannot be proven in front of a Court of Justice which enforces it. This is also 
called a problem of hidden action. Typically, in PPPs, the agent’s action takes the form of effort 
exertion and its effect is either to increase the probability of having a high-quality project 
outcome or facing lower costs. In both cases, effort enhances the principal payoff. It is worth 
to emphasize that moral hazard, as adverse selection, are issues only if the objective function 
of the firm and the one of the government are not the same. A key feature of effort exertion is 
that it produces disutility for the agent, it is expensive in terms of time and money. The agent 
has no incentive to exert effort as his payoff is negatively affected by doing so. Essential for 
the agency cost to arise is the asymmetry of objective between the principal and the agent. On 
the one hand, effort exertion has a positive effect on the principal payoff. On the other, the agent 
has only an extra cost and no benefit from the effort. To solve the agency conflict between the 
parties, the principal must deign a contract such that the agent will find it more convenient to 
exert effort than not to. It is important to keep in mind that the quality of the project cannot be 
used as a perfect proxy for the agent’s effort since the relation between the two is not 
deterministic. This uncertainty is the key to a clear understanding of the moral hazard problem. 
The random output of the project is the result of the agent effort and the realization of pure luck. 
The principal thus offers a contact where, bearing a cost, it induces the agent to take the desired 
action even if it is not directly or indirectly observable. If doing so is too expensive the principal 
will either opt to stay in the partnership knowing the agent will not exert effort or will decide 
not to take part in the agreement3. 
 
3 For a clear theoretical discussion of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard we suggest chapters 2 and 
4 of “The theory of incentives I: The principal-agent model” by J.J. Laffont and D. Martimort (2001). 
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Another aspect of PPP that creates scope for adverse selection and moral hazard is that the 
relationship between the parties can be considered as one-shot. Even if the delegation of the 
service to the private sector is characterized by a long term, in many PPPs the parties must 
define how their interaction will develop at the beginning it. Once the parties have drafted and 
signed the contract, they typically do not have the chance to change it in a second moment. In 
addition, it is likely the government will not hire the same company for different PPP projects. 
This makes the relationship defined in each project one-shot. Thus, the principal and the agent 
cannot rely on the repetition of their interaction to achieve an efficient allocation of resources 
and smooth information asymmetry issues. 
Given the primary importance of the issues related to asymmetric information, they have been 
the focus of many scholars in the analysis of PPPs. As anticipated, some of them point out that, 
greater delegation to the private party could create scope for information gathering on the agent 
side (Baron and Besanko, 1984; Iossa and Martimort, 2012; Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013).  
Precisely, Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) maintain the private entity is likely to acquire better 
information on how costs will change in the operation phase if unforeseen events happen. It is 
thus worth considering how incentives to exert effort on improving the quality of the 
infrastructure and to not acquire private information impact the performances of PPP compared 
to traditional procurement. As usual, the authors consider two periods: the building and the 
operation phase. They assume that, when the parties sign the contract, they can only specify the 
basic features of the service to be provided. Later, once the infrastructure is in place (end of the 
first phase) the parties realize how the basic design of the infrastructure can be improved to 
provide a better service. If the agent succeeds in providing an innovative design for the 
infrastructure, the principal can add the new features at a low cost, if not, the costs are high. 
The quality of the infrastructure depends on the innovation effort of the agent. However, it is 
not directly observed by the principal, she only obtains a noisy signal. Additionally, consider 
that the builder, in the first stage, can spend resources to acquire private information on the 
future costs of enhancing the service. This can have only a strategic purpose as the same 
information can be gathered by the operator for free in the second stage. It follows that it is a 
socially wasteful activity that the government will be interested in discouraging. 
Under traditional procurement, the only way the government can promote innovation effort is 
by rewarding the agent based on the verifiable but noisy signal it gets. On the contrary, under 
PPPs, the consortium will see the second-period information rent it will realize by providing an 
innovative infrastructure and will be encouraged to exert innovation effort. Therefore, PPPs 
have the advantage that the public authority does not need to pay a limited liability rent to 
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induce innovation effort. Nonetheless, the disadvantage, is that the consortium will lever the 
information rent obtained in the first phase. Thus, making it more costly for the principal to 
carry out the second-stage service improvements. It can be concluded that the government will 
prefer PPPs when the signal on the agent’s effort is particularly noisy to avoid the high limited 
liability rent that would have to be paid under traditional procurement. On the opposite, a strong 
signal on the effort exerted by the agent will make the traditional procurement preferable. In 
addition, if the wasteful cost of information gathering is relatively low the principal will opt for 
a Public-Private Partnership because the benefit of indirect effort incentives will exceed the 
social cost of inefficient information gathering (Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013). 
Besides Hoppe and Schmitz (2013), also Iossa and Martimort (2012) focused on how the 
organizational form is related to the project implementation uncertainty when studying 
delegated project management. They conclude that PPPs are superior to traditional procurement 
when operational risk and informational asymmetries are limited. If this is not the case, the 
private party can gain a disproportionate advantage through private information. Similarly to 
Hoppe and Schmitz, bundling favors innovative design and is more cost-efficient when demand 
risk is low, when a precise measure for service standards exists, when the quality of the 
infrastructure is not easily verifiable, and when unforeseen circumstances can be addressed with 
an affordable adaptation of the used technology. Furthermore, the provision of a radically new 
service can hinder the PPP-related efficiency gains due to the lack of knowledge needed to 
anticipate the impact of unfamiliar design, procedures, or technology on the cost of operations. 
Differently, consider a service that has been provided for a long time under more traditional 
forms. If there is scope to modernize the way of provision keeping the level of risk relatively 
low, PPPs turn out to be suitable. Having the previous provision of the service, no matter in 
which form, generating the appropriate expertise to foresee the contingencies that may arise 
during operations (Iossa and Martimort, 2012). 
An interesting perspective on the moral hazard issue in PPP projects is taken by Engel et al. 
(2014). In their analysis they introduce the figure of the sponsor, who is the equity investor in 
charge of bidding, developing, and managing the agreement. The authors study the life cycle 
of PPP finance and relate the moral hazard issues to the type of financing that is more suitable 
for the project. Initially, in the construction phase, the project outcome depends widely on the 
action of the sponsor and the private firm. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome quality, 
and the major design changes that can occur create scope for moral hazard. At this stage, the 
role of banks acting as mitigators on the moral hazard issues is of vital importance. They have 
the power to enforce strict control over any change in the project contract. Moreover, banks can 
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monitor the behavior of the parties involved by providing funds progressively and only at 
project steps completion. In the operation phase of the project, after the building of the 
infrastructure, the project related risk decreases significantly and the scope for moral hazard 
too. The cash flow from the project is still susceptible to risk but it depends to a lower extent 
on the action of the parties involved. In this stage, since the control over moral hazard is not as 
important as before, bond finance becomes the most suitable source of financing. Bondholders 
are interested only in the events that can considerably affect the project cash flow underpinning 
the debt but do not directly take part in the PPP management. The operation phase of PPPs is 
then open to institutional and other passive investors for whom the high-risk of the construction 
phase was prohibitive. 
Examining the literature on PPPs concerning asymmetric information and contract design 
emerges that most of the contributions focus on moral hazard issues (Martimort and Pouyet, 
2008; Iossa and Martimort, 2012 and 2015; Engel et al., 2014; Danau and Vinella, 2015; 
Marimort and Straub, 2016; Buso et al., 2020) rather than adverse selection (Auriol and Picard, 
2009 and 2013). If the selection of the agent happens in a competitive environment using a fair 
auction the assumption of no adverse selection can be reasonably justified. The empirical 
evidence shows the procurement process of PPP contracts tend to be longer and more onerous 
than in the traditional procurement. Precisely, between the 5 and 10% of the project costs derive 
from the bidding phase (Yescombe, 2007), and the bidding process lasts an average of 34 
months (data on PFI projects closed between 2004 and 2006) (NAO, 2007). This evidence 
allows for maintaining that the adverse selection issue is likely to play a minor role in PPP 
contracts. 
However, the problem of moral hazard, being related to the hidden action of the agent, is more 
difficult to be ruled out. As the agent’s effort is likely to affect the project outcome and it is 
difficult to be assessed by the principal, many authors have decided to assume no adverse 
selection and focus on the more compelling problem of moral hazard.  
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Chapter 2 – THE REAL OPTIONS APPROACH 
2.1 - Irreversibility, magnitude, and uncertainty 
In the opening paragraph of this chapter, we focus on three characteristics of PPP projects that 
considerably affect the way this kind of agreement should be modeled. They are the 
irreversibility of PPP investments, their magnitude, and the high level of uncertainty coming 
both form the project itself and from the environment surrounding it. These three aspects make 
the traditional method of the net present value (NPV)4  unsuitable for the evaluation of PPP and 
require the use of a more sophisticated technique such as the real-option approach. The reason 
for this, the explanation of what a real option is and how it can be applied in the analysis of 
PPPs will be investigated later in the chapter. 
In general, a decision is considered irreversible if it is not possible to modify its outcome once 
it has been taken. In other words, for a long time, it narrows down the spectrum of available 
choices (Henry, 1974). For instance, suppose to have the choice to chop down one hectare of 
the Amazonian forest in favor of croplands. The decision to preserve the forest is not 
irreversible as the option to free space for croplands is still available. On the contrary, once the 
trees are chopped down it is not possible to have the forest as it was for a long time; this is an 
irreversible choice. Moreover, choices differ in their degree of irreversibility, and investments 
do the same. Consider investing in a power plant, if oil is the only fuel that can be burned the 
investment is more irreversible than building an equivalent power plant where oil, as well as 
other types of fuels, can be used. 
One of the most common reasons for investment irreversibility is that the capital is firm or 
industry-specific. This meaning that the capital invested in one firm cannot be used productively 
in other companies or sectors. In this case, if the investment turns out to be non-profitable the 
company does not have the chance to divest. The assets do not have value for other firms and 
thus the price at which they can be sold (if one) does not allow recovering from the expense 
incurred. The expenditure on firm-specific assets is a sunk cost.  
Sector-specific investments are typical of Public-Private Partnerships. According to the data of 
the World bank group on private participation in infrastructures (PPI)5 in 2019 this type of 
investment was concentrated in four main sectors: Transport, Energy, Water, and Municipal 
Solid Waste (MSW). Of the total US$96.7 billion invested across 409 projects in the world, 
 
4 Invest in a project only when the present value of its expected cash flows is greater than, or at least 
equal to, the one of its costs. 
5 Annual PPI Database Global Report, 2019. 
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US$ 47.8 billion were invested in the transport sector, US$ 40.1 billion in the energy sector, 
and the remaining US$ 8.8 were almost equally split between MSW and Water (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1, Source: Annual PPI Database Global Report, 2019, World Bank Group 
All the just mentioned industries tend to require investment in assets that have no value outside 
the specific sector for which they were initially meant. Consider, for instance, railways, ports, 
and airports, if for some reason they are not as profitable as expected and it is not economically 
convenient to keep them in operation it is almost impossible to recover the initial investment. 
Even dismantling the infrastructure, selling (if possible) the raw materials, or looking for 
alternative uses of the assets the chance of recouping the original expense seems at least very 
optimistic. The same is valid for power plants in the natural gas and electricity sector where the 
technology used is not employable for any other application. 
Besides being irreversible, PPPs tend to be particularly onerous. According to the data of the 
World bank group on PPI, between 2014 and 2019, the average project size ranged between 
US$ 229 in 2016 and US$ 324 in 2014 million. Moreover, in 2019 the maximum amount 
invested in a single project was US$ 8.6 billion while the maximum recorded in the entire period 
is about US$ 37.7 billion in 2015 (Table 1). In general, a project is considered “small” when its 
size is below US$ 100 million. In Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), 
small projects were about half of the total both in 2018 and 2019, whereas middle-size project 
(US$ 100 million – US$ 500 million) went from 39 percent in 2018 to 35 percent in 2019. 
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Finally, large projects (US$ 500 million - US$ 1 billion) rose from 4 to 8 percent in 2019 
(Figure 2). 
 
Table 1, Source: Annual PPI Database Global Report, 2019, World Bank Group. 
 
Figure 2, Source: Annual PPI Database Global Report, 2019, World Bank Group. 
In conclusion, PPPs are characterized by a considerable level of uncertainty. First, there is the 
uncertainty related to the project itself. The parties do not know in advance the quality of the 
outcome, it is usually assumed to depend both on the agent’s effort and pure luck. The cash 
flows generated by the project is itself uncertain and subject to unforeseeable demand 
fluctuations. The construction and operation costs can be estimated before the project is initiated 
but are likely to differ from the initial assessment. Second, also the environment surrounding 
PPP is a source of uncertainty. Capital cost, regulatory requirements, political risk, and 
technological changes are just some of the variables that have the power to affect the project 
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outcome. These factors have the potential to alter the proper functioning of PPP contracts, and 
in some cases, completely jeopardize the good outcome of the project. 
2.2 - Flexibility and investment timing 
The investment irreversibility, the considerable project size, and the pervasive uncertainty 
surrounding PPP have the potential to seriously hinder the use of these agreements. Also, 
considering the long term of the contract, scholars and PPP stakeholders have indicated the 
injection of more flexibility in PPP agreements as a feasible way to make them more attractive 
for the parties involved. In this context, the term “flexibility” is used to describe provisions that, 
once embedded in the contract, allow for an immediate reaction by the parties to unforeseen 
changes in the assumptions on which the contract was based (Demirel et al., 2017). Flexibility 
clauses in PPP investments can take the form of guarantees on the project cash flows or key 
variables for the project profitability. Alternatively, they can allow the private party to early 
terminate the contract or to defer the payments for the initial investment. These are just 
examples but the ways to inject flexibility in PPP contracts are virtually infinite.  
As most major investments, PPPs have an important characteristic that can have a great impact 
on the decision to invest. The parties can decide to delay the investment to acquire more 
information on prices, project costs, and other market conditions before committing resources. 
On some occasions, the investment must be carried out immediately as strategic or social needs 
require to do so. However, in most cases, the parties of the PPP agreement have the chance to 
decide the investment timing. The cost to delay is given by the forgone cash flow and social 
benefit. The gain is the possibility of acquiring important information on the project variables. 
Given the high level of uncertainty, and the significant and irreversible commitment entailed 
by PPP projects, the balance between benefits and costs can be positive, and the decision to 
postpone the investment optimal.  
Irreversibility impairs the theoretical foundation of the standard NPV rule for investment 
decisions: “An investment is worth to be undertaken when the difference between the present 
value of its expected cash flows and the one of its costs is at least nonnegative”. This principle 
does not consider that once an investment is carried out, the investor loses the option to wait 
and acquire more information. Irreversible investments are particularly sensitive to the 
uncertainty over the future project cash flows, operating costs, and interest rates. This enhances 
the value of waiting to solve some of the mentioned uncertainties. In other words, the traditional 
NPV rule does not consider the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest. Including it 
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in the computation, one can still use the “positive NPV” terminology. However, traditionally 
the NPV rule has always overlooked the value of delaying the investment. 
The characteristics of an irreversible investment can be seen in analogy with a financial call 
option. The holder of a call option has the right (in an interval of time) to receive a financial 
asset (e.g. a stock) at a prespecified price called exercise price. A firm having an investment 
opportunity is faced with an analogous choice. It can afford a known initial investment to have 
an asset of some future uncertain value. If the asset value rises, the payoff of the investment 
increases. If it falls, the firm can decide not to invest and loses just what it spent to obtain the 
investment opportunity (Pindyck, 1990). This analogy is the basic intuition of the real options 
approach to investment. Being central in our work, it is explained in greater detail in the next 
paragraph.   
2.3 - Real options 
To understand what real options are, it is useful to state a basic definition of traditional financial 
options. First, financial options are derivative instruments, meaning that they do not have value 
for themselves but derive their value from the underlying instrument they are written on. For 
example, a stock option derives its value from the one of the stock, which is the so-called 
underlying. Two basic types of options exist: call and put options. Starting from these two a 
virtually infinite number of more complicated compound options can be created. A call option 
gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy a certain amount of an instrument on a 
certain date in the future, at a price agreed today. A put option gives the holder the right, but 
not the obligation, to sell a certain amount of an instrument on a certain date in the future, at a 
price agreed today. The option is said to be exercised when the holder buys (call) or sells (put) 
the underlying instrument covered by the option contract. The investor will decide to exercise 
the option and buy (sell) the underlying asset only if the market price of it is higher (lower) than 
the one agreed in the option contract. At that point, and this is important to our purpose, the 
investor will have the gain deriving from the difference between the current price and the agreed 
price of the underlying but will lose the chance to exercise the option in the future. The option 
can be exercised only at its maturity date it is of the European type while American options can 
be exercised at any time until the maturity date. Finally, since financial options give just the 
option but not the obligation to buy or to sell the underlying, they do not come for free but at a 
premium. 
The term “real option” was first coined by Myers (1977) who noticed the analogies between 
financial options and future investments by corporations. The firm that holds the option to make 
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and investment can arbitrarily choose to undertake it or not. The mechanism is, thus, analogous 
to a financial option with the only difference that in one case the underlying is a financial asset 
(financial options), whereas in the other it is a real asset (real options). To fully understand the 
analogy between real and financial options it is worth going true the main variables on which 
their value hinges upon (Martins et al., 2015): 
1) The time to maturity as meant in financial options is translated, in real options, as the 
span in which the investment opportunity is available to the firm. Real options are often 
seen as American options since in most cases the company has the option to invest in 
an interval of time and not on a specific maturity date. 
2) The exercise price in real options is the initial sunk cost that the company must bear to 
begin the investment, or, in the divestment case, the amount of money received by the 
firm. 
3)  The volatility of the stock return in financial options corresponds to the variability of 
growth in project value when considering real options. In both cases, once the option is 
exercised, the investor owns (in the case of a call option) either the stock or the asset, 
the value of which will fluctuate stochastically. This uncertainty captures the 
unpredictability of the cash flows coming from the project. 
4) Today share price is associated to the present value of the expected cash flow of the 
real asset. 
5) The risk-free interest rate over the life of the option has the same meaning in both real 
and financial options, being the theoretical interest rate returned in case of a riskless 
investment. 
6) The dividends of the traditional stock option parallel the value lost waiting to invest in 
the asset. While the company is waiting to invest it is bearing the opportunity cost of 
the missing cash flows. This aspect is particularly important to understand the trade-off 
entailed by the decision to wait. The more the firms wait before investing the more 
information it will gather on the future cash flows. However, the cash flows forgone by 
not initiating the project must be considered in the decision. When the marginal benefit 
equals the marginal cost of waiting the optimal timing to perform the investment is 
found. 
Also, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) explain the analogy between real and financial options. In brief, 
they say that the option holder has the right (need not to be exercised) to bear the investment 
cost (exercise price) and receive a project (the stock) the value of which fluctuates 
stochastically. Form this analogy, it is possible to apply financial option pricing methods to the 
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study of the optimal investment rule. This intuition has inspired other scholars who have seen 
the potential of its application. PPP agreements, being subject to irreversibility and uncertainty 
have also been studied through this lens. 
2.4 - Applications to PPP of the real options approach 
The flexibility clauses introduced in PPP to allow the parties to adapt to unforeseen changes in 
the project environment show real option characteristics. Every time a provision is included in 
the contract it generates some value for the parties, that value can be quantified using the real 
options approach. The number of arrangements the parties can find is almost unlimited. For this 
reason, the literature has focused on the most common provisions introduced in PPP contracts 
and observed in real-world applications. 
Some scholars have considered the introduction of flexibility in PPP agreements in the form of 
guarantees. One example is the granting of a minimum revenue guarantee (Huang and Chou, 
2006). Since revenues in infrastructure projects are often subject to a considerable level of risk, 
the government can agree to recognize a minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) to limit the 
downside risks. When this clause is active, if the operating revenue of the private company falls 
below a certain threshold the government is obligated to cover the shortfall. The MRG can 
enhance the chances the concessionaire will be willing to participate in the project and will also 
improve the creditworthiness of it. Having a guaranteed cash flow will ensure a minimum level 
of debt coverage. 
Alternatively, in the case of transportation services, one can consider guaranteeing a minimum 
level of usage of the infrastructure. This is the case of what is called a minimum traffic 
guarantee (MTG) (Blank et al., 2016). When the operating revenues of the company are tied to 
the demand for it, the public party can agree to cover the revenue loss if the traffic goes below 
a pre-defined level. This type of guarantee can also be associated with a maximum traffic ceiling 
that allows the government to control for a higher-than-expected return placing a cap on 
revenues deriving from extraordinary traffic volumes.  
Other types of flexibility clauses that can be included in PPPs are the abandonment or 
cancellation options (Huang and Chou, 2006; Alonso-Conde et al., 2007; Blank et al., 2016; 
Busoet al., 2020) that allow the concessionaire to abandon the project before the natural end of 
the concession or to the government to terminate the concession period early. Finally, also the 
possibility of deferring payments has been considered to make PPPs more attractive (Alonso-
Conde et al., 2007). 
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Overall, from the literature emerges that the above-mentioned options do generate value in PPP 
contracts. However, when more options are considered together in the same project, for a 
correct assessment of their value, an analysis of the interactions among options must be carried 
out. It can be the case that two or more options complement each other value or that their values 
are substitutes and thus they counteract each other, and their values are reduced. 
Huang and Chow (2006) consider as a numerical example the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project 
to value a minimum revenue guarantee and the option to abandon in the pre-construction stage 
of the project. The first model they propose considers each option independently, it is a single 
option pricing model. The second accounts for the interaction among option values, it is a 
compound option model. The option to abandon allows the private party to abandon the project 
during the pre-construction phase while the MRG works as explained above. From the single 
option pricing model, both options can create substantial values. On the contrary, under the 
compound option model, the two options have a negative effect on each other value. As the 
MRG is increased the option to abandon decreases in value. Economically speaking, as the 
government is willing to guarantee a higher revenue the private party has fewer reasons to 
abandon the project. The minimum revenue can be raised to a point where the firm has no 
reason to abandon given the strong downside risk protection it is enjoying. In that case, the 
abandonment option is valueless. However, rising the MRG involves considerable expenses on 
the side of the government, its benefits and costs need to be carefully evaluated and justified. 
On the contrary, granting an abandonment option seems a better alternative under binding 
budgetary constraints, also, its justification is easily understandable. 
Interaction among options is considered also in the analysis of the real options embedded in the 
PPP for the construction and operation of the Melbourne CityLink project (Alonso-Conde et 
al., 2007). It is the first example of a motorway network characterized by fully automated 
tolling. The options included in the agreement are two. An option to defer the payments and the 
chance of anticipated cancellation of the investment. The former is held by the private company 
and it is shown it can be modeled as a put option. The latter is in the hands of the government 
which can decide to terminate the concession period early and, in the model, it is treated as a 
call option. The authors have used a Monte Carlo simulation approach to value the options and 
their interaction under different scenarios. They conclude there is no monotonic relation 
between the option value and variations in the project volatility. This is justified by the complex 
path-dependent nature of the options. However, the value added by including the two options 
in the contract is measured as being over 10% of the value of the company. The downside of 
providing financial incentives to foster private investments in infrastructures is again their 
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impact on the government’s budget. As policy advice, this aspect needs to be carefully analyzed 
at the time the revenue guarantee is defined in the contract. 
To conclude this section, two works that studied minimum traffic guarantees are analyzed. The 
first examines the MTG alone and no interaction with other options is taken into consideration. 
The second studies a case of a Public-Private Partnership where the MTG is offered in 
combination with a maximum traffic ceiling and an abandonment option. 
Studying the MTG in isolation, the authors conclude that having the government sharing part 
of the risk with the private party is necessary to make some classes of highly risky projects 
attractive to private investors. Intuitively, the higher the risk of the project the higher the need 
for a guarantee to make private companies willing to participate in the partnership. The main 
limit to MTG is the outlay required by the government. To reduce the risk of too high liabilities 
on the government side, an effective solution is the use of caps on the total expense associated 
with a specific level of MTG. Limiting the outlay on the single project allows the government 
to split its resources on a wider range of projects thus leveraging its investment capability 
(Brandao and Saravia, 2008). 
The second work offers a different perspective on how the MTG value changes when combined 
with other options. The authors study a hypothetical PPP contract for a 25-year toll road 
concession. In this contract, the profit of the private party depends on the future level of traffic 
on the toll road (the greater the traffic the higher the profit). However, the amount of traffic is 
not known in advance. If it falls below a certain threshold, the project is no longer profitable, 
and the concessionaire has an incentive to break the agreement. To smooth the uncertainty 
regarding the future profitability of the project and to make it more attractive the government 
enriches the agreement with three options: a traffic guarantee, a traffic ceiling, and an 
abandonment option. From the point of view of the concessionaire, the first two work 
respectively as a long position on a put option and a short position in a call option. The 
underlying asset is the traffic. The strike “price” for the put is the traffic guarantee (the level 
below which the concessionaire receives a payment form the government). The strike “price” 
for the call is the traffic ceiling; if it is exceeded, the company will pay the government the 
excess profit. Finally, there is the abandonment option, which allows the firm to breach the 
contract and walk away paying at most a very low abandonment fee. The interactions between 
these options are studied by the authors using a simulation and an analytical method. What 
results is that the government can shape the traffic guarantees and the abandonment option in 
such a way that three main goals are achieved: the private party is willing to undertake the 
project, the probability of abandonment is lowered to an optimal level, and the risk exposition 
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of the government is minimized. Working on these three aspects will allow maximizing the 
overall value of the options (Blank et al., 2016). 
2.5 - Contract design in a real options framework 
At this point, two strands of the literature on PPPs have been presented. The first, analyzed in 
the first chapter, focuses on asymmetric information, principal-agent problems, and the theory 
of incomplete contracts. The real options embedded in the agreement and their importance on 
risk allocation and project valuation are ignored. The second strand, studied in the previous 
paragraph, on the contrary, has the specific goal of valuing the flexibility clauses included in 
PPP (e.g. minimum revenue guarantee, deferred payments, abandonment) considering their real 
option characteristics. Doing so, it determines the optimal investment policy in a real options 
framework. Nonetheless, it does not consider contract design and performance incentives. 
Given the significance of both aspects of PPPs, a third strand of literature has tried to bridge 
the gap between the other two. It aims at finding the optimal specification of PPP contracts 
giving the proper attention to the real options that are commonly observed to be part of these 
agreements. 
A recurring feature in the third strand of literature is the attention to the timing of the investment 
that is determined inside the model instead of being taken exogenously. Silaghi and Sarkar 
(2018) design a clear example of a model that merges the real option aspects of PPPs with the 
contract design theory. The two authors focus on a hidden action problem. The government is 
assumed to have an option to invest in a specific project and to delegate the exercise decision 
(when to begin the project) to the agent. The information asymmetry arises because the 
government is not able to directly observe the effort of the private party. The only parameter 
observed is the quality of the outcome, when the firm exerts effort it enhances the chances of 
having a high-quality project. Being in the best interest of the government to obtain a public 
service of high quality, it will have to design a contract that makes it more convenient for the 
firm to exert (costly) effort. The offer of the government takes the form of a menu of contracts, 
and the variables at stake are the investment triggers (that define the timing at which the project 
is initiated and begins to produce cash flows) and the compensation of the firm that is expressed 
as a fraction on the cash flows generated by the project. A combination of investment triggers 
and firm compensation will be offered for each quality level (high or low) of the project. With 
this menu of contracts, the government has the chance to induce the firm to initiate the 
investment at the first best trigger. However, to do so, the principal must pay an informational 
rent to the firm. The basic model is then extended including an additional abandonment option. 
The private party, exercising the option, has the right to require a bailout from the government 
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if the situation deteriorates. From this setting, the optimal contract, the social loss, and the effect 
of the bailout option are illustrated using a numerical example (Silaghi and Sarkar, 2018). 
Investment timing is also central in the analytical work by Takashima et al. (2010). The paper 
investigates the interaction of the government and a private firm over the investment timing in 
a PPP project. Differently from Silaghi and Sarkar (2018), the authors consider perfect 
symmetry of information between the parties. In this framework, the effect of a government 
guarantee and cost-sharing on the investment timing is shown. The authors define first-best and 
second-best investment timing. The former maximizes the sum of the firm and government 
payoffs. The latter maximizes the value of the private firm only. The result is that when the 
value of the government guarantee is high and/or the cost-sharing rate of the private party is 
low, the first-best exercise timing is later than the second-best. 
The assumption of symmetric information is relaxed in the paper by Soumare and Lai (2016). 
The private company has more information on the project quality than the government does 
(the so-called plum problem). Compared to Silaghi and Sarkar (2018) this is a problem of 
hidden information instead of hidden action. The authors study the support of the government 
in PPPs project in two forms: loan guarantee and direct investment. In the first case, the 
government commits to pay for the loan that is used to finance the project, if the private party 
turns out to be insolvent (i.e. default). The government reduces the interest payments that are 
tax-deductible and, thus, increases the taxable income. The loan guarantee is seen as a put 
option written by a backer to a bondholder. Under the second form, the government participates 
directly in the investment and in return receives a share of the project. The number of shares 
received by the government act as a bargaining tool. The higher the number of shares in the 
project the more the government can successfully ask for additional information. When the 
asymmetry of information is particularly pronounced the government must consider requiring 
a higher share in the project to smooth their negative effect. Also, Soumare and Lai (2016) 
conclude that a loan guarantee is more effective in diminishing the project’s borrowing rate. In 
the case of high asymmetric information, the project sponsors should prefer, ceteris paribus, a 
loan guarantee to a direct investment, if not they will have to give up more control over the 
project and gain lower earnings. 
Another paper considering the problem of hidden information in a PPP agreement is the one by 
Buso et al. (2020). In their contribution the authors model a case where the government entrusts 
a private party to build, maintain, and operate an infrastructure project offering as payment the 
collection of user charges. To encourage investment the government offers a one-time grant 
and an early-exit option. The latter can be exercised by the private party at any time but entails 
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a termination fee defined at the contract formation. If the option is exercised, the government 
will resume the project undertaking the responsibility for the provision of the service. Also, the 
contract defines at which moment the investment must be initiated. Again, the investment 
timing is treated as an endogenous variable. A continuous-time setting is assumed, and the 
information asymmetry arises from the fact that the private company holds exclusive 
information on operating profits. According to the authors’ findings, the grant of the exit option 
encourages a quicker implementation of the project (and thus exertion of the public benefits) 
with lower costs relative to a lock-in contract. Moreover, the combination of the exit-option 
with direct subsidies (the one-time grant) alleviates the problems related to the asymmetry of 
information for particularly risky projects.  In so doing, it reduces the government’s expenses 
even considering the extra cost borne in the case it has to take charge of a loss-making project 
upon the exercise of the abandonment option. The paper proves that, if properly accounted for 





Chapter 3 – INTRODUCTION TO THE MODELS 
3.1 - The bargaining power of the parties 
In the present literature on PPPs, an aspect that has received only marginal attention is the 
bargaining power of the participants. Most of the papers that consider the principal-agent 
problem between the government and the public firm just assume that one of the parties (usually 
the principal) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other. In that case, there is not a bargaining 
phase as the entire bargaining power is in the hands of who makes the offer. However, we 
believe that in a typical PPP agreement the bargaining power is likely to be allocated to both 
parties. For several reasons it is not realistic to assume that the agent has no decisional power 
on any of the variables involved in the contract. First, consider that in a PPP contract the agent 
must bear the initial sunk cost. To do so, since the considerable size of the average PPP project 
is likely to exceed the financial means of a private company, the agent has the burden of finding 
the proper sources of financing committing to repay the lender once the project starts to generate 
cash flows. Second, the competencies required to carry out a PPP project are highly specific. In 
most cases just a few firms will be able to handle the technical complexities related to a PPP 
project, reducing the competition on the private party side. Third, as pointed out at the beginning 
of the chapter, PPPs are characterized by a substantial level of risk bore by the agent and by a 
considerable level of uncertainty deriving both from the project itself and from the environment. 
All these elements make the agent an active part of the contractual relationship with the 
principal. It is likely that bearing significant responsibilities, the private company will not 
passively let full decisional power to the government over the variable at stake. The agent will 
claim an active role over the decision of at least some of the variables. This calls for introducing 
in the models for PPPs a bargaining phase between the government and the private party. 
Differently, if it were the government financing the project it is reasonable to assume that it will 
decide autonomously the contractual offer to the private company. It will formulate a take-it-
or-leave-it offer over every variable at stake. In this case, the problem does not require to 
introduce the bargaining between the parties and can be limited to study the classical issues 
related to the asymmetries of information.  
The contractual relationship between the parties involved in a PPP should not be merely seen 
as the principal hiring the agent but as a more complex interaction in which the two partners 
reach an agreement for the completion of a complex task. Even if the interests of the public and 
private entities are usually divergent, it is advantageous for both to find a compromise that 
allows them to profitably carry out the project. The allocation of bargaining power has been 
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proven to affect the joint surplus deriving from the contract (Pitchford, 1998). Depending on 
how the bargaining power is split, the joint surplus varies drawing an efficient frontier. 
3.2 - Flexibility values 
Given the contractual relationship that incurs among the government and the private party, the 
introduction of flexibility provisions in the contract can serve as a powerful tool to ease the 
reaching of a mutually profitable agreement. The flexibility clause will more effectively play 
this role if it is advantageous for both parties. However, most of the literature previously 
analyzed has focused on provisions that were beneficial for just one of the parties. Consider the 
above-mentioned minimum revenue guarantee, the minimum traffic guarantee, the maximum 
traffic ceiling, the abandonment option, the option to delay payments, and the early-cancellation 
option. In all these cases is one party gaining value while the other is losing it. 
Most of the time the provisions are meant as a “bribe” offered by the government to the firm to 
induce its participation in the PPP; featuring a sort of hierarchical interaction between the 
entities involved. This view is not in line with the contractual relationship incurring among the 
two parties. If we intend the private firm and the government negotiating to complete a project 
that would be individually infeasible, the most effective form of provision should be meant to 
create contractual value for both parties. In this regard introducing flexibility over the 
investment timing is pertinent. It is not advantageous just for the firm, which gains access to 
information that counteracts the project-related uncertainty, but also for the government that 
improves the chances of obtaining a better project. 
Introducing the investment timing, as a variable in the contractual arrangement, justifies the 
adoption of the real options approach. If the government allows to postpone the investment, and 
the parties find optimal to carry it out in a date different form today, option value is created. On 
the contrary, if the government imposes to invest immediately for strategic reasons the 
possibility of delaying the investment is not on the table, and the traditional NPV rule is suitable 
to assess the value of the agreement. 
3.3 - Our contribution 
From the analysis of the literature, two aspects have emerged as remarkable in the study of PPP. 
One concerns the issues related to the asymmetry of information among the parties. As the 
government delegates to the firm the completion of the project, the latter is likely to acquire 
private information or to be in the condition of hiding its action form the principal. For this 
reason, PPPs are subject to inefficiencies deriving from adverse selection and moral hazard. 
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The principal, to solve the asymmetry of information, must pay what is called an information 
rent that makes the agent revealing its private information or action. In general, PPPs tend to 
suffer more of moral hazard than adverse selection issues. If the process for selecting the agent 
takes place in a competitive environment using, for instance, a fair auction, one can reasonably 
assume that the problem of adverse selection is solved. As done by most of the PPP literature 
our work focuses on the moral hazard problem and assumes no adverse selection in the 
delegation process. 
The other concerns the flexibility provisions embedded in the PPP contracts and their option-
like characteristics. To assess how they alter the value of the contract scholars have used the 
so-called real options approach. It is based on the analogy between financial options and 
investment opportunities and allows applying financial option pricing methods to the study of 
the optimal investment rule. In our contribution, we inject flexibility in the PPP agreement 
treating the investment timing as endogenous and defined by the parties. In other words, the 
principal and the agent can decide if they want to begin the project immediately or to postpone 
the investment to acquire more information on the uncertain variables of the project. If they opt 
to do so there is some option value of waiting to consider in the project evaluation. To account 
for this, we use the real options approach. 
An aspect that is instead missing in the current literature on PPPs is the study of the bargaining 
power of the parties. Typically, the scholars studying PPP contracts assume that the principal 
has all the negotiating power and formulates a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the agent. However, 
we believe that, given the significant responsibilities of the agent in the project, it is more 
appropriate to assume that also the private company will have bargaining power over at least 
some of the variables at stake. 
A central aspect of the study of bargaining power is the way it can be modeled. Three ways are 
described in the literature. First, one can consider a standard Principal-Agent model and 
increase the reservation utility of the agent to raise his bargaining power. Second, the same 
moral hazard problem can be studied using a Nash-bargaining solution. Third, the bargaining 
power can be studied in an alternating offer game with moral hazard. Demougin and Helm 
(2006) compared the three models in a setting with risk-neutral parties and a financially 
constrained agent. They show that the same set of contracts arises in each of the three cases. In 
our contribution, the first two ways of modeling the bargaining power are used to describe the 
interaction between the government and the private firm. We replicate the study by Demougin 
and Helm (2006) showing how the principal payoff depends on the bargaining power of the 
agent in a PPP framework. 
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The foundation for the present work is to be found in the paper by Buso et al. (2020). In the 
model presented by the three authors and that we use as a benchmark, a public authority 
(principal) has the option to undertake an investment for the provision of a public service and 
decides to delegate the exercise of the option to a private firm (agent) that has relevant expertise. 
For the delegation, a PPP contract is used. As usual in moral hazard problems (hidden action), 
the quality of the project depends on the unobservable effort of the agent. What is observable 
and thus, contractible, is the realization of the stochastic process that defines the cash flow 
deriving from the project. To induce effort the principal formulates an offer based on the 
investment timing (that takes the form of a realization of the cash flow) and a fixed transfer. 
The paper is thus combining real options theory with agency conflicts in the study of PPPs.   
Departing from Buso et al. (2020) we first expand the model defining the interaction between 
the two parties in a two-stage process (Benarjee et al., 2014). First, there is the bargaining 
between the parties over some of the variables at stake. Subsequently, the government 
formulates a take-it-or-leave-it offer on the remaining variables. A new variable is introduced 
as the government is now receiving a share of the cash flow of the project. In this setting, two 
cases are studied. In the first, the government and the firm bargain on how to share the cash 
flow, and then the government formulates a take-it-or-leave-it offer on the investment trigger 
and the fixed transfer. In the second, the government and the firm bargain on how to share the 
cash flow, and on the investment timing, then the government formulates a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer on the fixed transfer. Form this second case emerges that the option to invest is considered 
as jointly held by the two parties. In Buso et al. (2020) the government delegates the option to 
invest to the private party and then offers a contract to make the investment timing socially 
optimal. Differently, in our contribution, the two parties bargain on the timing of the investment. 
As in a jointly held option, the government and the firm must agree on the investment timing 
to be able to exercise the option. 
The second way used to describe the bargaining power of the parties is by introducing the 
reservation utility in the benchmark model.  Here the process is not in two stages anymore as 
the government makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer on the investment trigger and the fixed transfer. 
However, the offer must grant a certain level of utility to the agent, the higher that level of 
utility is, the more demanding is for the government to achieve it. It follows that as the 
bargaining power of the agent rises, the payoff of the government will shrink in favor of the 
one of the agent. The model can offer interesting insights into the dependence of the payoff 
function of the agent’s reservation utility. First, the payoff function is divided into two 
segments. After a certain reservation utility level, the government is not able to induce effort 
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anymore, the agent will have no incentive to make effort and the probability of a high-quality 
outcome will be lower.  Also, the shape of the function is worth to be studied. It results that, as 
the reservation utility goes up the payoff of the agent goes down. Moreover, the latter decreases 
at a decreasing rate as the function is convex.  
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In the next chapter, the benchmark model is 
presented defining the setup and the notation that will be used throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Subsequently, chapters 5 and 6 present, in the order, the Nash-bargaining model and the 




Chapter 4 - THE BENCHMARK 
The present chapter presents the model by Buso et al. (2020) that is used as a benchmark for 
the analytical part of this work. Their paper is a contribution to that strand of the literature on 
PPPs that combines the studies on mechanism design and contract theory with the models that 
focus on the value of the real options embedded into PPP agreements. 
The two parties, whose interaction is studied in the model are, as usual in the PPP literature, a 
public authority (principal), and a private company (agent). The first has the opportunity to 
invest in an infrastructure for the provision of a public service and is contemplating the idea of 
engaging in a PPP with the private party. To the latter will be assigned the goal of completing 
a project that will start generating a cash and a public benefit flow upon delivery. The efficient 
outcome of the partnership is hindered by a moral hazard problem. Exerting effort the agent 
could enhance the probability of providing a high-quality service that translates into a greater 
public benefit and cash flow. However, the effort is expensive for the agent and the principal 
cannot observe it directly. To enhance the probability of having a high-quality outcome the 
government has to offer a menu of contracts to the agent that will provide the right incentives 
to exert effort. To be contractible a variable must be observable by both parties. The optimal 
menu of contracts is studied under two scenarios. First, the agent has no negotiating power and 
will accept to participate in the project as long as his NPV does not fall below zero. In this case, 
the moral hazard issue does not affect the investment timing, so the first-best timing is 
guaranteed, the surplus of the project is shared among the two parties, and the project efficiency 
is not harmed. Second, the agent agrees to participate in the partnership only if his net present 
value is strictly positive. In this occurrence, the project efficiency is less than optimal, the first-
best investment timing is not always achieved, and the private party obtains a rate of return 
higher than the hurdle rate. Considering the investment timing in their work, the authors prove 
that the agent’s negotiating power not only transfer surplus from the principal to the agent but 
also harms project efficiency. 
4.1 - Model set up 
The model involves two parties. A public authority (principal) and a private firm (agent). The 
principal has the option to invest in a facility that will generate a social benefit flow (𝑏), a cash 
flow (𝑥𝑡) and will require an initial investment (𝐼). The firm, instead, possesses a relevant 
expertise in designing and managing the facility. As an assumption, the infrastructure will 
require no time to be carried out, starts immediately to generate a cash flow, and has an infinite 
lifetime. To help figuring the situation, a good example of the infrastructure could be a new 
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highway. Besides the private benefit enjoyed by direct users, it generates a social benefit as it 
helps to unload the urban traffic and to control local pollution. The tolls paid for the use of the 
highway are the mentioned cash flows. 
The timeline along which the interaction between the principal (she) and the agent (he) develops 
is as follows. At the beginning, there is a pre-contractual phase (𝑡 < 0) where the principal 
selects the more suitable firm to carry out the project. The two parties bargain on the 
compensation required by the agent to participate in the partnership. It is assumed that an agent 
with negotiating power will successfully claim a compensation that makes his net present value 
at the time of the investment strictly positive. Differently, if the agent has no negotiating power, 
he will accept a rate of return equal to the project’s hurdle rate. Defining which is the 
appropriate compensation entails a careful evaluation of the level of riskiness of the project. 
After the pre-contractual phase, the parties enter in the contractual phase. The government, 
based on what defined earlier, submits a contract to the agent. At this stage, the asymmetry of 
information between the parties plays a critical role. The public benefit b is a function of a 
random binary variable called θ that indicates the quality of the project. If the outcome of the 
project is of high quality, θ takes the value 𝜃1, if the quality is low it takes the value 𝜃2; where 
𝜃1 > 𝜃2, and  ∆𝜃 = 𝜃1 − 𝜃2 > 0. The probability distribution of the variable θ depends on the 
agent’s effort. If the firm exerts effort, a draw of 𝜃1 has probability  𝑞𝐻 ∈ (0,1), while with 
complementary probability 1 − 𝑞𝐻, θ will take the value 𝜃2. Differently, if no effort is exerted, 
𝜃1 will be observed with probability 𝑞𝐿 ∈ (0,1), 𝜃2 with probability 1 − 𝑞𝐿. Where 𝑞𝐻 > 𝑞𝐿, 
and thus ∆𝑞 = 𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿 > 0. The effort exerted by the agent comes at a cost 𝜉 > 0. Once θ 
assumes one of the two possible values 𝜃1 or 𝜃2, it then stays constant throughout the life of the 
project and, as a consequence, the value of the social benefit flow 𝑏(𝜃) does not change over 
time.  
The source of the moral hazard problem faced by the principal is the unobservability of the 
agent’s effort. Observing the realization of 𝑏(𝜃) she cannot infer whether the agent has exerted 
effort or not. Also, 𝑏(𝜃) is observable only after the contract is signed so it is not a contractible 
variable. What can be made part of the contract is the cash flow of the project, described by the 





= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧𝑡, 𝑥0 = 𝑥 
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Where the initial value is 𝑥0 = 𝑥 , μ gives the risk-neutral rate of drift, σ is the positive constant 
volatility, while 𝑑𝑧𝑡 is the increment of a standard Wiener process under the risk-adjusted 
measure and satisfies the conditions 𝐸(𝑑𝑧𝑡) = 0 and 𝐸(𝑑𝑧𝑡
2) = 𝑑𝑡. A positive rate of return 
shortfall δ is assumed, and so the risk-free interest rate 𝑟 is greater than μ: 𝛿 = 𝑟 − 𝜇 > 0. Once 
the infrastructure is carried out it yields a rate of cash flow of 𝛿𝑥𝑡 to the stakeholders either as 
dividends or liabilities. δ is the rate of return that an investment with the same risk profile would 
yield to a potential investor. Given δ, when the agent has negotiating power, he will be able to 
gain from the project a rate of return higher than δ, on the contrary, if the agent has no 
negotiating power, he will receive exactly δ. If the return of the agent falls below δ he will 
decide not to take part in the partnership with the government. What makes the variable 𝑥𝑡 
contractible is the assumption that its realization is observable in each moment by the parties. 
Besides 𝑥𝑡, the other variable that is used by the principal in the menu of contracts offered to 
the agent is a fixed transfer called ω. In the contractual phase, the principal will come up with 
two contracts to be offered to the agent. One specifies the investment trigger and the transfer to 
be received in the case of a high-quality project (𝑥1, 𝜔1), the other the same variables if the 
quality of the project is low (𝑥2, 𝜔2). The investment trigger is a key variable in this setting, as 
it defines the investment timing6. Once the stochastic process 1. hits the value specified in the 
contract the agent must invest, the trigger will be different if the quality of the project is high 
or low.  
At 𝑡 = 0 the principal has offered the menu of contracts to the agent {𝑥𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). Right 
after the contract is signed, the parties observe the realization of the binary random variable θ 
and know if the outcome of the project will be qualitatively good or bad. In the first case, the 
investment will be carried out when the stochastic process hits 𝑥1 otherwise when it hits 𝑥2. 
Once the investment is initiated the private party will receive respectively 𝜔1 or 𝜔2. In the 
contract, the investment timing is identified in terms of the realization of the stochastic process 
1. The stochastic nature of the process does not allow defining a date when to carry out the 
investment. However, once 1. hits the investment trigger, we can identify an instant in time for 
the beginning of the investment. In our notation, that moment in the future when the investment 
is undertaken is indicated as 𝜏, such that 𝜏 > 07. From the contract offered and the 
 
6 In the contract the principal wants to specify the time of the investment. However, being the process 
1. stochastic, it is not possible to determine a date in terms of days or years. Thus, the government 
defines the moment in which to invest in terms of the stopping times 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 which are realizations 
of 1. When the project outcome is of high (low) quality and the stochastic process hits the value 𝑥1 (𝑥2) 
the investment is carried out. See Appendix, part A. 
7 𝜏 = inf (𝑡 > 0 | 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝜏) 
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characteristics of the stochastic process 1. will follow the agent’s NPV and the principal’s NPV 
at time τ. The former is8: 




] + 𝜔(𝑥𝜏) − 𝐼 =
𝑥𝜏
𝛿
+ 𝜔(𝑥𝜏) − 𝐼 
The latter is: 








In conclusion, notice that the variables 𝐼 and 𝑥𝑡 are assumed to be independent of θ. On the 
contrary 𝑏(𝜃) is not. Thus, exerting effort has no effect on the agent’s payoff but only on the 
principal’s one. This assumption defines a perfect asymmetry of objectives between the 
principal and the agent. 
Departing from this setting the authors proceed as follows. First, they describe the first best 
solution and the principal-agent setting. Then they find the optimal contracts considering agents 
with and without negotiating power. 
4.2 - First best 
The first best contract is the one that the principal would offer if she were able to observe the 
agent’s action. In this section 𝑏(𝜃) is assumed to be constant to ease the notation. As explained 
above, the optimal investment rule says to invest if the value 𝑥𝑡 is at or above a specific 
threshold that here will be indicated as 𝑥𝜏. In other words, the optimal investment timing is the 
first instant in which the process for 𝑥𝑡 reaches the critical value 𝑥𝜏9. The contract specifies the 
investment trigger 𝑥𝜏 and the fixed transfer 𝜔(𝑥𝜏). The objective function of the principal is 
her own payoff at time τ discounted back at 𝑡 = 0, it will be indicated as 𝑅𝐵(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔). She will 
maximize it subject to the participation of the private party, i.e. the agent’s NPV at time τ 
discounted back at 𝑡 = 0 must be nonnegative. 
More formally the maximization problem is: 
4. max
𝑥𝜏,𝜔










8 Where B stands for benchmark. 
9 The value of 𝑥0 is assumed to be low enough such that is not optimal to invest immediately, 𝜏 > 0. If 
it were not the case, the option value of waiting would go to zero and the use of a real options framework 
for the analysis of the interaction between the parties would lose meaning. 
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𝐹𝐵(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔) ≥ 0 
Where 𝑌𝐵(𝜔) and 𝐹𝐵(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔) are defined in 3. and 2. respectively. 





 is used to discount both 𝑌𝐵(𝜔) and 
𝐹𝐵(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔). The optimal investment threshold lies in the future (recall 𝜏 > 0, i.e. 𝑥𝜏 > 𝑥0) but 
the terms of the contract have to be defined at 𝑡 = 0, so a proper discount rate is needed. The 
term 𝛽 > 1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation 𝛹(𝜁) ≡
1
2
𝜎2𝜁(𝜁 − 1) + 𝜇𝜁 − 𝑟 =





, 𝛽, and 𝛹(𝜁). 
The objective function 4. can be also expressed as the difference between the project’s total 
welfare 𝑊(𝑥𝜏) and the agent’s NPV 𝑉(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔) at 𝑡 = 0. 𝑊(𝑥𝜏) is the sum of the payoffs of the 
principal and the agent at time 0. As 𝜔 is a transfer from the former to the latter it cancels out 
and does not appear in 𝑊(𝑥𝜏) that depends only on the present value of future cash and social 
benefit flows, and on the investment expenditure. 
The maximization problem becomes: 
6. max
𝑥𝜏,𝜔

















Here the agent is assumed to have no negotiating power. Thus, the principal will appropriate 
the entire surplus from the project while the agent merely expects to break even. The 
government will find optimal to offer an 𝜔 that brings the firm’s NPV to zero10: 




The 𝑥𝜏 that maximizes eq. 7. is 
















> 1 is the option multiplier that captures the effect of uncertainty. 
See part A of the Appendix for its derivation.  
 
10 BFB stands for benchmark first best. 
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Now, substituting 9. into 8. it is obtained: 










Summarizing, the optimal contract offered by the principal is11: 










From 11. results: 










4.3 - The investment problem under moral hazard 
In this section as in the rest of the work, the action of the agent is hidden, and the principal faces 
a moral hazard problem. For studying how the parties interact under asymmetric information, 
𝑏(𝜃) is assumed to be a random variable as described in the model set up. Based on the contract 
she is offering, the principal designs a mechanism to induce the agent to exert effort. The two 
contractible variables are the cash flow 𝑥𝑡 and the fixed transfer ω. The menu of contracts 
offered to the agent takes the form {𝑥𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). The contract maximizes the principal’s 
ex-ante investment option value guaranteeing the participation of an effort exerting agent in the 
partnership. The maximization problem is as follows: 
13. max
{𝜔𝑖,𝑥𝑖},𝑖∈{1,2}

















− 𝜔𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
The objective function must be maximized under two orders of constraints, ex-ante and ex-











































+ 𝜔𝑖 − 𝐼, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
 






. Also, for 𝜏 > 0 it is 






Constraint 14. is the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint. It ensures that the agent will 
weakly prefer to induce effort. Thus, it ensures there is no unobservable action on the agent’s 
side at the time of the investment. 
Constraint 15. is the ex-ante participation constraint. It guarantees that the private company will 
be willing to take part in the partnership, by requiring that its payoff is nonnegative. If this 
constraint is not satisfied there is no reason for the agent to abide by the principal’s choice of 
transfers and investment triggers. 
The ex-post constraints are: 
16. 𝐹1
𝐵 ≥ 0 
17. 𝐹2
𝐵 ≥ 0 
18. 𝜔1 ≥ 0 
19. 𝜔2 ≥ 0 
The inequalities 16. and 17. guarantee to the agent that, irrespective of the realization of θ, his 
payoff will be nonnegative. The inequalities 18. and 19. follows from the assumption that the 
transfer to the private company that is undertaking the investment cannot be negative. In other 
words, the government can, under certain circumstances, grant no transfer to the firm but it is 
not reasonable to think that it will tax the company carrying the investment out. 
4.4 - Optimal contracts when the agent does not have negotiating power 
An agent with no negotiating power fails to claim 𝐹𝑖
𝐵 > 0, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. The problem 13.-19. can 
be slightly reduced. The authors prove that in this circumstance equations 15. and 16. are always 

















and inequalities 17.-19. 
The result is12: 
Benchmark proposition 1 When the agent does not have negotiating power, the principal offers 






𝐵𝐹𝐵 + 𝛷1} 
 





























To be noticed that the transfers 𝜔1
▴ and 𝜔2
▴ are expressed as functions of the investment triggers 
𝑥1
▴ and 𝑥2
▴. This is used to highlight that 𝑥𝑡
▴ is the only contractible variable in the PPP 
agreement and that in the contract the triggers and the transfers are defined in couples. Also, 
the variables 𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝐹𝐵 and 𝜔𝑖
𝐵𝐹𝐵 are strictly related to 𝑥𝐵𝐹𝐵 and 𝜔𝐵𝐹𝐵, they are their respective 
realizations for 𝜃 = 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
Form the menu of contract 21.-22. it follows that the principal is always able to obtain the 
optimal investment timing, i.e. 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝐹𝐵 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. When the outcome of the project is of low-
quality, she does so by setting 𝐹2
𝐵(𝑥2
▴, 𝜔2
▴) = 0. The agent, having no negotiating power, 
accepts a contract offering a net present value of zero at the time of the investment. If the 
outcome is of high quality, the public authority must pay an information premium 𝛷1 > 0 to 
induce the agent’s effort and thus 𝐹1
𝐵(𝑥1
▴, 𝜔1
▴) > 0. Guaranteeing a higher payoff in the case 
of a high-quality outcome is essential to have the agent exerting effort. If the private company 
receives an equal payoff for any manifestation of θ, it does not have any incentive to afford the 
cost of exerting effort and will decide not to. The condition under which it is more convenient 
















































𝐵𝐹𝐵) is the difference between the 
project total welfare in the first best when θ takes respectively the value 𝜃1 or 𝜃2. The left-hand 
side is the gain from effort exertion. It follows from the fact that the overall welfare is higher 
when 𝜃1 is observed and the effort enhances the chance of having good quality. The right-hand 
side is the total social cost of effort, ξ paid by the agent and 
𝑞𝐿𝜉
∆𝑞
 paid by the principal. 
4.5 - Optimal contracts when the agent has negotiating power 
The negotiating power of the agent is modeled assuming slack the constraint on his payoff, i.e. 
𝐹𝑖
𝐵 > 0, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. He can successfully claim a strictly positive NPV at the time of the 
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investment. The maximization problem 13.-19. is solved assuming that the constraints 16. and 
17. are slack. The solution is13: 
Benchmark proposition 2 When the agent has negotiating power, the principal offers the 













































Differently from the previous case, the principal faces an insurance-efficiency trade-off. When 
the quality of the outcome is low, she will postpone the investment by setting a trigger higher 
than the optimal one. Simultaneously, the fixed transfer 𝜔2
▴▴ is brought down to the minimum, 
i.e. 0. The principal, not being able to guarantee the optimal timing, decides to save at least on 
the fixed transfer. In this case, the positivity of the agent’s payoff depends only on the cash flow 
of the project. The principal allows the agent to postpone the investment, thus obtaining a higher 
cash flow, but grants no transfer. On the contrary, under 𝜃1 the optimal investment timing is 
achieved. However, to do so the principal faces a higher cost due to the negotiating power of 
the agent. As before, 𝛷1 > 0 is the rent that must be paid to solve the agency conflict. On the 
other hand, 𝛷2 > 0 accounts for the cost deriving from the agent’s ability to claim a rate of 









𝐵𝐹𝐵. The transfer is higher than the no-negotiating-power case if the outcome is qualitatively 
good, it is lower if the outcome is qualitatively poor. The optimal investment timing is achieved 
only if 𝜃 = 𝜃1. 
The principal will find it convenient to induce effort if the following condition holds: 




The left-hand side is, as before, the gain from effort exertion. To change is the right-hand side 
as the cost to induce effort is increased. The term ∆𝑅𝐵 > 0 is the difference between the 




▴) and the same 
 








▴▴). This difference 
gives the magnitude of the agency cost associated with the agent’s ability to claim a return 
higher than δ. It follows that inducing effort exertion in this case is more demanding than under 
condition 24. and the principal will decide to do so less often. 
4.6 - Remarks 
Buso et al. (2020) have successfully endogenized the possibility of choosing the investment 
timing describing it as a real option embedded in the PPP agreement. Moreover, they have 
found a contract design method to solve the agency conflict between the public authority and 
the private party involved in the PPP agreement. Yet, this is no guarantee on the achievement 
of the first best solution. The negotiating power of the agent creates inefficiencies that hinder 
the use of these contracts, it may lead to underinvestment in PPPs and inhibit the use of 
incentive contracts by public administrators. 
From their results emerges that the bargaining process between the parties involved in PPPs 
could have primary importance in determining the success of these agreements. However, the 
modeling of a bargaining game between the two parties goes beyond the scope of the paper. 
This aspect is the one our contribution wants to investigate. To do so, a model of Nash 
bargaining and a P-A framework that allows for increasing agent’s reservation utility levels are 
developed. Both are designed as extensions to the model described in this chapter. It will be 
used as a reference in terms of methods and notation throughout the rest of this work and its 




Chapter 5 - NASH BARGINING 
Differently from the previous chapter, here we introduce the bargaining between the 
government and the firm by modelling it as a Nash bargaining14. The setting from which we 
depart is the one by Buso et al. (2020) described in the previous chapter, also the notation 
follows from there. For a better understanding of the methodology used here, it is worth to 
briefly introduce the contribution by Banerjee et al. (2014). 
The three authors examine the exercise of a jointly held real option to make an investment. The 
parties involved are assumed to be two for simplicity. They can be two firms that have the 
option to start a joint venture or an entrepreneurial firm, owning the project, and an investor 
providing financing. Their identities notwithstanding, for the exercise of the option they must 
agree on how to share the proceeds from the project and on the investment timing. Their 
interaction is modeled in two stages. One is the bargaining phase over how to share the revenues 
from the investment. The other is the choice of the investment timing, this decision is assumed 
to be in the hands of only one of the parties. In the reference paper both the possible orders of 
the two stages are considered. The more relevant for the purpose of the present work is the one 
where, at first, the two parties bargain on how to split the revenues, and successively, the one 
entitled decides the timing to exercise the option. In this case, at the end of the bargaining phase 
on how to split the proceeds, the option of one of the firms (call it T) to decide the investment 
timing is still alive. Once the investment terms have been set, firm T will decide the timing that 
maximizes its own payoff. However, during the bargaining phase, the parties are aware of how 
T will act for each possible allocation of the proceeds in the first phase and will anticipate that 
when bargaining. To model this interaction a two-stage maximization problem is used, as the 
investment timing to be chosen is anticipated during the bargaining, the problem is solved 
backward. First, the payoff function of the firm deciding the timing is maximized with respect 
to when initiating the investment. Second, the timing decision is substituted into the bargaining 
function that is maximized to obtain how the parties will agree to share the revenues from the 
investment project. 
The situation described in the model by Banerjee et al. (2014) differs from the interaction 
between a public authority and private firm in a PPP under many aspects. First, two firms taking 
part in a joint venture act with the only intent of maximizing their own payoff while, when the 
government is involved, it will bring into play the public benefit besides the private advantages 
deriving from the project. Second, the relation between two private parties is generally different 
 
14 The original work is “The bargaining problem”, Nash, 1950. 
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from one where a public authority interacts with the private sector as the former has regulatory 
power over the latter. Third, the authors do not consider any issue related to the asymmetry of 
information between the parties, while it is a vital aspect to be included when studying PPPs as 
pointed out by many scholars (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Iossa and Martimort, 2012 and 
2015; Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013). However, the framework of Banerjee et al. (2014) can be 
adjusted to be successfully applied to model the interaction between the public and private 
parties involved in a PPP agreement. 
Precisely, in the present chapter we describe the interaction between the government and the 
private entity as a two-stage process. First, there is a bargaining phase over some of the variables 
at stake. Subsequently, the government formulates a take-it-or-leave-it offer on the remaining 
variables. The variables included in each of the two stages change with our assumptions on 
which aspects are the object of the bargaining. In general, the contractual arrangement is based 
on the investment triggers 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ (1,2), the fixed transfer granted to the firm 𝜔𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2), and 
a new variable indicating the share of the cash flow from the project that goes in the pockets on 
the firm. The assumption that the government and the firm will share the cash flow of the project 
works as a bridge between the interests of the two parties as now both have a gain coming from 
the cash flow. This makes the option to invest a jointly held real option, compared to the pure 
delegation due to the total asymmetry of objectives between the parties in Buso et al. (2020). 
The share received by the principal is indicated as 1 − 𝛼, the one of the agent as α, where 0 ≤
𝛼 ≤ 1.  
The models are presented in the following order. First, the first-best solution when the parties 
bargain only over α and the principal formulates her offer on 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝜔1, 𝜔2 is found, assuming 
the principal can observe the effort exerted by the agent. Second, the model under moral hazard 
is solved with the two parties bargaining only over α. Third, the parties are allowed to bargain 
over the optimal triggers 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and the share of cash flows α is assumed to be 1. Fourth, the 
assumption of 𝛼 = 1 is relaxed and the parties bargain over 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and α. 
In each model the two-stage maximization problem is solved backward. The parties are 
assumed to foresee during the bargaining phase what the offer of the government will be. The 
first step is thus to maximize the government payoff with respect to the variables not included 
in the bargaining. This gives the value of the variables of the take-it-or-leave-it offer as a 
function of the others. Plugging them in the bargaining function and maximizing with respect 
to the bargaining variables allows finding the optimal contract. The goal of each considered 
version of the model is to find the optimal contract, i.e. the values of: 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝜔1, 𝜔2, and α. 
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Depending on how the interaction among the parties is designed they will bargain only over α, 
and then the government will have the power of deciding 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝜔1, 𝜔2, or they will jointly 
decide also the timing of the investment defining together the optimal triggers 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and the 
principal will be entitled to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer only on the fixed transfers 𝜔1, 𝜔2. 
Every model will consider the moral hazard problem as described in Buso et al. (2020). 
5.1 - First best 
In this part it is delineated the contract that the principal submits to the agent when it can observe 
his effort exertion. For simplicity, the level of θ is assumed constant and, with it, the level of 
𝑏(𝜃). The principal has to define the transfer she wants to grant to the firm and the optimal time 
for the investment. As all the information on how the process 1. evolves is contained in 𝑥𝑡, the 
moment in which to invest takes the form of a threshold on the variable 𝑥. When the stochastic 
variable 𝑥𝑡 hits the threshold 𝑥𝜏, it is the optimal moment to carry out the investment. As an 
assumption, the initial value of 𝑥 is lower than 𝑥𝜏 (i.e. 𝜏 > 0), it is not optimal to invest 
immediately and this guarantees the option to invest has a positive value. The problem solved 
by the principal is the maximization of her expected payoff (that is the value of her option to 
invest) under the condition that the agent with no negotiating power will participate. 
More formally the maximization problem is: 
28. max
𝑥𝜏,𝜔














𝐹(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔) ≥ 0 
Where 











is the principal’s payoff at time τ and 




] + 𝜔 − 𝐼 =
𝛼𝑥𝜏
𝛿
+ 𝜔 − 𝐼 
is the agent’s net present value (NPV) at time τ. 





 is used to discount both 𝑌(𝜔) and 𝐹(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔).  
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The objective function 28. can be also expressed as the difference between the project’s total 
welfare 𝑊(𝑥𝜏) and the agent’s NPV 𝑉(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔). The maximization problem becomes: 
32. max
𝑥𝜏,𝜔
𝑅(𝑥𝜏, 𝜔) = max
𝑥𝜏,𝜔
𝑊(𝑥𝑡) − 𝑉(𝑥𝑡, 𝜔) 
Where, 


























The government will find optimal to offer an 𝜔 that brings the firm’s NPV to zero15: 




The 𝑥𝜏 that maximizes eq. 33. is 
















> 1 is the standard option multiplier that captures the effect of 
uncertainty. See appendix, part A. 







Summarizing, the optimal contract offered by the principal is16  









From 37. results: 










The contract obtained in 37. is closely related but not equal to the one found in the benchmark 
model by Buso et al. (2020) and reported in 11. The optimal investment timing is the same in 
both models, 𝑥𝐵𝐹𝐵 = 𝑥𝐹𝐵 . When the agent is not receiving the entire cash flow, the principal 
 
15 FB stands for first best. 








 and 𝛼 >
𝛽−1
𝛽
. Also, for 






compensates him by increasing the fixed transfer but holding the investment timing optimal.  
Precisely,  𝜔𝐹𝐵 oscillates between I, when 𝛼 = 0, and 𝜔𝐵𝐹𝐵, when 𝛼 = 1. As expected, the 
first derivative of 𝜔𝐹𝐵 with respect to α is negative17, the higher the share of the cash flow in 
the hands of the firm the lower the fixed transfer from the principal to the agent. The reason 
why the principal can always increase the fixed transfer and stick to the optimal investment 
timing is that, even at its maximum, 𝜔𝐹𝐵 is affordable. Indeed, for 𝛼 = 0 it coincides with I, 
that is the maximum transfer the government can grant to the firm. If the transfer outlay exceeds 
I, the government does not find convenient to hire a private firm to undertake the investment as 
it can afford the sunk investment I on its own and save money. If it were the case, that for some 
value of α, the fixed transfer to the agent exceeded the threshold of I, the principal could have 
decided either not to take part in the partnership or to postpone the investment offering to the 
agent a transfer lower than I. Postponing the investment means, under our framework, to 
increase the investment trigger. If it is done, the expected cash flow when the investment is 
initiated, i.e. 𝑥𝜏18, rises. Thus, the cash flow to be split among the principal and the agent is 
greater and the agent will be willing to accept a lower fixed transfer since the value of his share 
in the cash flow has risen. In other words, the principal can enhance the agent’s payoff in two 
ways, either by postponing the investment or by increasing the transfer. Depending on the 
situation, the principal will use one of this two instruments to maximize her payoff still inducing 
the participation of the agent. 

















Where the parameter 𝜂 ≥ 0 indicates the bargaining power of the principal and 1 − 𝜂 the one 
of the agent. Notice that from 34. we have that 𝐹(𝑥𝐹𝐵 , 𝜔𝐹𝐵) = 0. It follows that the bargaining 
function 39. is null and α cannot be determined. 
5.2 - Moral hazard and bargaining over α 
In this section, it is considered the case where the two parties bargain on how to share the cash 
flow generated by the project, i.e. they bargain over α. The problem is solved backward as in 
Banerjee et al. (2014). First, 𝛼 is assumed to be exogenous and the objective function of the 
 





) < 0 
18 The geometric Brownian motion followed by 𝑥 is a Markov process, therefore the best forecast for 
the future is the current value of 𝑥. 
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government is maximized with respect to 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝜔1, and 𝜔2. Second, the optimal values for 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝜔1, and 𝜔2 are plugged in the bargaining function that is then maximized with respect 
to 𝛼. 





















































 𝐹2 − 𝜉 ≥ 0 
43.  𝐹1 ≥ 0 
44.  𝐹2 ≥ 0 
45. 𝜔1 ≥ 0 



















When the agent has no negotiating power, the constraints 42. and 43. can be proven to be always 
slack (see Appendix). Reducing the problem and solving it the result is: 













































, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 





𝐹𝐵 are positive, it follows that also 𝑥1
∗ and 𝜔1
∗ are positive. The condition 
for the positivity of 𝑥2
∗ is 𝛼 > 𝑞𝐻 while the one for 𝜔2










Finally, it can be easily verified that the always slack inequations 42. and 43. are satisfied by 
the solution {𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝜔𝑖
∗}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). 
Comparative static on α 
Before solving the second part of the model related to the bargaining over α, this section 
presents some comparative static on α. As expected, the results for the optimal menu of 
contracts  {𝜔𝑖
∗, 𝑥𝑖
∗} depend on the parameter α. The sensitivity analysis can help to understand 
the dynamics of this dependence. 
First, recall that 𝑥𝑖
∗ is assumed to be bigger than the initial value of 𝑥, and positive. The former 
guarantees the option value to be greater than zero, the latter assumes the government will never 
undertake a project that has a negative expected cash flow19. For this assumption to be valid, 
the value of α must be greater than 𝑞𝐻, if not 𝑥2
∗ goes below zero. Besides, also the value of 𝜔𝑖
∗ 
has to be non-negative: it is possible to have no transfer from the government to the firm 
undertaking the project, but it is meaningless to consider a situation where the firm is required 
to pay a tax to the government (i.e. 𝜔𝑖
∗ < 0). For the non-negativity of 𝜔2
∗  it is required that 









. This condition is more stringent than the previous one20 and 
defines a lower bound for the parameter α. Finally, to have a non-negative 𝜔𝑖
𝐹𝐵, α needs to be 
greater or equal than 
𝛽−1
𝛽
. Which of the two constraints on α will be binding depends on the 
value of the parameters, both need to be verified in the analytical part of the bargaining over α. 
Second, while 𝑥1
∗ and 𝜔1
∗ coincide with the results from the initial model (Buso et al. 2020), 𝑥2
∗ 
and 𝜔2
∗  do not. When the principal  is maximizing not only the social benefit but also her share 
of the cash flow of the project and she observes a poor outcome quality she opts for deviating 
from the first best (i.e. 𝑥2
𝐹𝐵 , 𝜔2
𝐹𝐵). Specifically, she postpones the investment setting a higher 
𝑥2
∗21 , and simultaneously it grants a lower fixed transfer to the firm22. Initiating the project 
when the forecasted cash flow is higher makes the firm willing to accept a lower transfer 𝜔2
∗ . 
 
19 The geometric Brownian motion followed by 𝑥 is a Markov process, therefore the best forecast for 
the future is the current value of 𝑥. 



















The solution obtained when the outcome is of low quality (𝑥2
∗, 𝜔2
∗) can be placed in between the 
cases with and without negotiating power of our benchmark model. The former brings the 
solution to the extreme where the time of the investment is delayed in such a way that the fixed 
transfer is brought to zero (𝜔2
▴▴ = 0), the latter keeps it at the first best. If the quality of the 
facility is low, both when the principal receives (1 − 𝛼)𝑥 and when the agent has negotiating 
power, the government delays the investment and lowers the fixed transfer. 
Bargaining over α 
This is the second step of the model. As introduced above, after finding the optimal contract 
offered by the principal to the agent, the optimal values for {𝑥𝑖, 𝜔𝑖}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} are plugged in the 






















































Where η indicates the bargaining power of the principal and 1 − 𝜂 the one of the agent. With 
𝜂 = 0, the Nash bargaining product equals the agent’s payoff, while if 𝜂 = 1 the principal’s 
payoff. 
Maximizing the logarithm of the function in 50., it results that the optimal α is equal to 1.  
Proposition 2 When the parties share the cash flow of the project and bargain on how to split 































The proof of Proposition 2 is given by substituting the value 𝛼 = 1 obtained form 50. in the 
contract of Proposition 1. For its simplicity, it is not included in the appendix. 
This result is the same as the Benchmark proposition 1. Allowing for different allocations of 
the cash flows among the parties will not affect the validity of the benchmark model. In the 
bargaining phase the parties’ optimal choice is 𝛼 = 1, i.e. the entire cash flow goes to the private 
party. This result mirrors the assumption of the benchmark model. Allowing for no bargaining 
51 
 
on how to split the cash flow Buso et al. (2020) are imposing that it will go entirely to the 
private party. 
This result (𝛼 = 1) shows that the government during the bargaining can achieve the optimal 
investment timing offering an adequate fixed transfer to the firm. Besides, notice that the agent 
is indifferent between any of the feasible values of α. He is aware that his payoff will be 0 when 
the outcome is of low quality, and that the payoff for a high-quality project does not depend on 
the allocation of the cash flows. Thus, the bargaining is solved with the best option for the 
principal who prioritizes the optimal investment timing. 
5.3 - Moral hazard and bargaining over 𝒙𝟏 and 𝒙𝟐 when 𝜶 = 𝟏 
In this section the case where the two parties bargain over the optimal triggers 𝑥1, and 𝑥2 is 
considered. The problem is solved backward as in Banerjee et al. (2014). First, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are 
assumed to be exogenous and the objective function of the government is maximized with 
respect to 𝜔1, and 𝜔2. Second, the optimal values for 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 are plugged in the bargaining 
function that is then maximized with respect to 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. For simplicity, α is assumed equal to 
1 in this initial model. 

















































𝐵 − 𝜉 ≥ 0 
56. 𝐹1
𝐵 ≥ 0 
57. 𝐹2
𝐵 ≥ 0 
58. 𝜔1 ≥ 0 









− 𝜔𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 





















Bargaining over  𝑥1 and 𝑥2 
This is the second stage of the model. As introduced above, in the first stage the optimal values 
for 𝜔1 and 𝜔2  that maximize the principal’s payoff are found. Then, they are plugged in the 












































Maximizing the logarithm of the function we obtain: 































For the proof see the Appendix, part B. 
As in Proposition 2, the optimal contract coincides with the one of the Benchmark Proposition 
1. Not including α in the bargaining and assuming it equal to 1 the optimal contract perfectly 
coincides with the benchmark. The parties during the bargaining phase opt for implementing 
the project with the optimal timing, irrespective of the realization of θ. However, to induce 
effort, the principal differentiates the fixed transfer depending on the quality of the project 
outcome. This justifies the presence of a positive information premium 𝛷1. Again, the results 
of Buso et al. (2020) are valid even considering the parties’ bargaining. 
5.4 - Moral hazard and bargaining over 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, and α 
Now consider the more general case where the government and the firm share part of the cash 
flow of the project. The parameter α indicates the share of the firm, while 1 − 𝛼 the one of the 
government. The problem is solved backward as before. First, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and α are assumed to be 
exogenous and the objective function of the government is maximized with respect to 𝜔1, and 
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𝜔2. Second, the optimal values for 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 are plugged in the Nash bargaining function that 
is then maximized with respect to 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and α. 







































𝐹2 − 𝜉 ≥ 0 
68. 𝐹1 ≥ 0 
69. 𝐹2 ≥ 0 
70. 𝜔1 ≥ 0 










, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 



















Bargaining over 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and α 
This is the second stage of the model. As introduced above, in the first stage the optimal values 
for 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 that maximize the principal’s payoff are found. Then, they are plugged in the 
Nash bargaining function that is maximized with respect to 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and 𝛼. The maximization 

















































Substituting 72. and 73. in 74. 𝛼 simplifies. The bargaining function does not depend on 𝛼 and 
does not allow to find an optimal value for it. Thus, the optimal contract in Proposition 4 will 
be only on the investment triggers and the fixed transfers.  
Maximizing the logarithm of the function we obtain: 
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Proposition 4 When the parties bargain on how to share the cash flow of the project, and on 

































For the proof see the Appendix, part B. 
The contract that emerges from the Proposition 4 mirrors the one of the Benchmark Proposition 




𝐵𝐹𝐵, the optimal 
transfers 𝜔1
𝐹𝐵 and 𝜔2
𝐹𝐵are respectively equal to 𝜔1
𝐵𝐹𝐵 and 𝜔2
𝐵𝐹𝐵 only if 𝛼 = 1. Differently, for 




𝐵𝐹𝐵. As the agent is not receiving the entire cash 
flow, the principal must compensate him in some other way to induce his participation. The 
optimal compensation turns out to be in terms of a greater fixed transfer. It is worth to notice 
that the information premium 𝛷1 does not depend on α, indeed it is exactly equal to the one of 
the Benchmark Proposition 1. Sharing the project cash flow among the parties does not help in 
smoothing the moral hazard problem, and the effort-inducing information rent is not affected. 
As anticipated, a limit of the model presented in this section is that it does not allow to find the 
optimal α that would emerge from the bargaining process.  
5.5 - Bargaining over 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, and α imposing  𝟎 ≤ 𝝎𝒊 ≤ 𝑰 
In this section we complicate the previous model. The bargaining function is maximized subject 
to new constraints over α. First, we impose a limited liability constraint on the government side. 
Indeed, the fixed transfer to the firm cannot exceed the investment expenditure 𝐼 otherwise the 
government will find more convenient to afford the investment cost than to pay the private 
company. Second, as already mentioned, the fixed transfer cannot be negative since it is not 
realistic to imagine that the government will tax the firm that already bears the burden of the 
investment cost. Introducing these constraints over 𝛼 we are also trying to obtain the optimal 
value of the parameter that was not found in the previous version of the model.  
The new constraints are: 
77. 𝜔1











+ 𝐼 ≥ 0 
78. 𝜔1
























Inequality 80. is always satisfied as 
𝛼𝑥2
𝛿
 is a non-negative quantity. The other three constraints 
































































The objective function 81. is the same as the one obtained substituting 72. and 73. into 74. 
Indeed, it does not depend on α. Differently, the constrains include α and consequently, the 
Lagrangian associated with the maximization problem does it too. 
The solutions to the maximization problem 81.-84. are: 
85. 𝑥1
𝐹𝐵 − 𝑥1 =
1−𝑞𝐻
𝑞𝐻






𝐹𝐵 − 𝑥2) 
Alternatively, 
86. 𝑥2

















































Complicating the maximization problem, the new constraints do not allow us to express 
explicitly the optimal values for 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and α. The only possible solution to the problem is 
numerical. However, 𝛼 can be expressed implicitly as follows. 
Proposition 5 When the parties bargain on how to share the cash flow of the project, and on 

























), 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
The objective function shows that 𝛼 does not enter in the payoff function of the agent or in the 
one of the principal. None of the parties is interested in bargaining on how to split the cash 
flows. From how we have designed the model, the government and the firm do not have a 
contrasting interest on α that could motivate bargaining over it. Thus, the only solution we find 
to the problem is numerical, not analytical. Observe that 𝛼 enters linearly in our model and this 
is probably the reason why it simplifies in the payoff functions of the parties. A possible 
solution is to reformulate the model introducing a nonlinear dependence on 𝛼 and see if it allows 
obtaining an explicit optimal value for the parameter. However, this goes beyond the scope of 
the present work.  
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Chapter 6 - RESERVATION UTILITY 
In the present chapter we present an alternative way of modeling the bargaining power of the 
parties. We introduce in the P-A benchmark model the agent reservation utility 𝑢, i.e. the 
minimum utility level required by the private party to take part in the partnership. The higher 
the agent’s bargaining power the higher his reservation utility. 
Recall that in the benchmark model the authors studied the case of an agent with negotiating 
power. They modelled it allowing for a private party that can successfully claim a rate of return 
higher than the hurdle rate of the project. Thus, they adopted a binary framework where either 
the agent has some negotiating power, or he does not. However, the concept of bargaining 
power is not necessarily discreet and can be modelled as continuous. Introducing the reservation 
utility allows us to do so. An interesting insight is provided by studying how the principal’s 
payoff function varies when the agent’s negotiating power increases. As expected, the 
principal’s payoff is a decreasing function of 𝑢. Moreover, having modelled the bargaining 
power in two different ways (Nash bargaining and reservation utility) it is possible to compare 
the optimal contracts obtained under the two circumstances23.  
6.1 - The model 
The maximization problem that will be used as a reference for the rest of the chapter is very 
similar to the one of the benchmark model, 13.-19. However, here the agent’s payoff is required 
to be grater or equal than the reservation utility 𝑢. This imposition makes the participation 
constraint and the restrictions on the non-negativity of 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 redundant. Indeed, once the 
agent’s payoff is equal or above the reservation utility, the participation of the agent is 
guaranteed, and the fixed transfers must be acceptable, i.e. greater than or, at least, equal to 
zero. The principal’s payoff is then maximized subject to the incentive compatibility constraint 
(needed to induce effort) and the two constraints on the agent’s payoff. 






































𝐵 ≥ 𝑢 
93. 𝐹2









+ 𝜔𝑖 − 𝐼, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
As stated above, to have the agent taking part in the agreement, the principal is forced to provide 
him with a net present value at least equal to 𝑢 for any quality level of the final outcome: either 
high or low. It follows that there is no economic reason for the government to offer a contract 
that grants the agent a NPV greater than 𝑢  with a low-quality outcome. The constraint 93. is 
then assumed to be binding for any level of 𝑢.  
The principal, when possible, will find optimal to induce high effort enhancing the chances of 
having a high-quality outcome24. To do so, at the minimum cost, the constraint 91. must be 
binding. Also, when the outcome is of high quality, the principal will have to ensure a NPV 
greater than 𝑢 to make the agent willing to exert effort. 




























Equation 94. makes clear that, depending on the level of u, the constraint 92. will be binding or 


























𝛽 → 𝐹1 = 𝑢  
Under alternative a., the constraint 92. is always slack. The principal offers to the agent a NPV 
at the time of the investment higher than 𝑢 when the output of the project is qualitatively good. 
She can differentiate what the agent gains based on the outcome quality and, in so doing, she 
induces high effort. On the other hand, under alternative b., we have  𝐹1 = 𝐹2 = 𝑢. When the 
agent’s payoff is the same irrespective of the project quality there is no reason for the agent to 
exert high effort, and the maximization problem must be modified as below. 
 
24 The condition under which the principal prefers to induce effort is found and discussed later. 
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We will solve the two cases separately. First, the case a. where the principal effectively induces 
effort is considered. The maximization problem is the one from 90. to 93. where 91. and 93. are 
binding while 92. is slack. Solving we obtain: 
Proposition 6 When the principal induces effort the optimal contract is: 
95. {𝑥1
•, 𝜔1
• } = {𝑥1
𝐵𝐹𝐵 , 𝜔1








• } = {𝑥2































From Proposition 6, we observe that when the project outcome is of high quality the principal 
chooses to implement the optimal investment timing, 𝑥1
• = 𝑥1
𝐵𝐹𝐵 . This comes at a cost as the 
transfer 𝜔1
•  is greater than 𝜔1
𝐵𝐹𝐵. Precisely, in addition to the information premium  𝛷1 of the 
benchmark model the principal must pay and additional information rent that depends on the 





. In other words, the principal is determined to obtain the 
optimal timing for the investment. As 𝑢 grows, she will compensate the agent with a greater 
fixed transfer but leaving the investment trigger 𝑥1
𝐵𝐹𝐵 unchanged and optimal. On the contrary, 
for a low-quality project outcome, the government will work on two sides to meet the 
constraints on the agent’s payoff and to induce effort. On the one hand, as 𝑢 increases, the 
investment will be postponed allowing the agent to obtain a higher expected cash flow at the 
time of the investment. On the other hand, the fixed transfer 𝜔2
• , depends negatively on 𝑢 and 
it will decrease as 𝑢 rises. 
The critical value for 𝑢 can now be expressed as a function of 𝑥1
•, and 𝑥2












𝛽 . Thus, 
it can be compared to the value of the exogenous variable 𝑢. If 𝑢 is smaller than the critical 













𝛽  the maximization problem changes. The principal cannot induce effort 
anymore and the probability of a high-quality project will be lower (𝑞𝐿). The maximization 




















𝐵 = 𝑢 
99. 𝐹2









+ 𝜔𝑖 − 𝐼, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
Solving the problem, we have: 


































, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
Proposition 7 tells that the optimal investment timing is never achieved. Both when the outcome 
quality is high and when it is low, the investment trigger will deviate from the optimum 
𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝐹𝐵 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} by the positive quantity 𝑢
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝛿. In addition, the greater the reservation utility 
of the agent the more severe the deviation from the optimum is. On the contrary, the fixed 
transfer granted to the agent shrinks as 𝑢 rises. As 𝑢 exceeds 𝛽
𝑏(𝜃𝑖)
𝑟
− 𝐼, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} the transfer 
𝜔𝑖
••, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} goes to zero. At that point, the agent will continue to postpone the investment 
keeping 𝜔𝑖
••, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} at zero. 
6.2 - The principal’s payoff as a function of u 
Plugging the optimal contracts of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7, respectively in 90. and 97. 
it is possible to study how the payoff function of the principal behaves as 𝑢 changes. The 
function will be divided into two different parts: the first is defined for 𝑢 ∈ (0, ?̂?), the second 













25. While 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the reservation utility that brings the transfer 𝜔2
•• down to zero. 
𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 is equal to 𝛽
𝑏(𝜃2)
𝑟
− 𝐼. From now on the payoff of the agent as a function of 𝑢 will be 
referred to as 𝜋(𝑢). 
 
25 ?̂? is expressed in terms of 𝑥1
• and 𝑥2
• because it derives from the constraint 91. that is part of the 
maximization problem that gives Proposition 6. 
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Substituting the results of Proposition 6 into the objective function 90. We obtain 𝜋(𝑢) when 
𝑢 ∈ (0, ?̂?): 











































































The principal’s payoff function for 𝑢 ∈ [?̂?, 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥] is obtained, similarly, by substituting the 
results of Proposition 7 into the objective function 97.: 


































































Equations 103. and 105. can give some useful insights on how the principal’s expected payoff 
behaves as 𝑢 grows. Differentiating eq. 103. with respect to 𝑢 we have: 






As expected, the first derivative is negative. Meaning that as the agent’s reservation utility 
increases the principal has a lower expected payoff. To study the rate at which 𝜋(𝑢) is 
decreasing the second derivative is computed: 

















The second derivative is positive. The function is convex, meaning that as 𝑢 increases 𝜋(𝑢) 
shrinks at a decreasing rate. Taking the first and the second derivative of eq. 105. it follows: 






































The result is analogous to the previous one. Again, the first derivative is negative while the 
second one is positive. The function is convex, meaning that as 𝑢 grows the payoff of the 
principal decreases at a decreasing rate. This is consistent with the fact that, as 𝑢 exceeds 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
the principal has always the chance of offering a null fixed transfer 𝜔𝑖
••, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} to the agent, 
simultaneously rising the investment trigger 𝑥𝑖
••, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} to make the expected cash flow of 
the project high enough to ensure the agent’s participation in the partnership. Theoretically, the 
investment can always be postponed. However, this will make the chosen trigger diverging 
dramatically from the optimal one and the principal’s payoff will go asymptotically to zero. 
It is worth to be noticed that equation 106. is less negative than equation 108. This follows from 
𝑥2
• being greater than both 𝑥2
••, and 𝑥1
••. Therefore, the first segment of the principal’s payoff 
function will decrease slower than the second. 
This information allows studying the condition under which the principal will prefer to induce 
effort. If for 𝑢 = 0 (the minimum value of 𝑢) equation 103. has a greater value than equation 
105., the former will be strictly preferred to the latter for the entire interval (0, ?̂?). 







𝐵𝐹𝐵. This helps the comparison of the two functions and gives the 

























The present condition coincides exactly with the one reported in 24. That is the condition, in 
the benchmark model, under which the principal prefers to induce effort in the case of an agent 
with no negotiating power (i.e. 𝑢 = 0). Assuming 110. to hold, it can be concluded that 103. is 
superior to 105. for 𝑢 ∈ (0, ?̂?). At the critical value ?̂? equation 103. cease to exist and from that 





The present work analyzed the optimal design of a PPP contract modeling different aspects of 
these complex agreements. First, we assumed that the government faces a problem of moral 
hazard when delegating the firm to build and operate an infrastructure. Second, we considered 
the investment timing as endogenous to our model. In other words, the parties can decide when 
to initiate the investment. This possibility takes the form of a flexibility provision embedded in 
the contract and is modeled following a real options approach (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Third, 
we studied the bargaining power of the parties allowing it to be split between the government 
and the firm. This is innovative in the literature on PPP as scholars have typically assumed that 
the principal has all the negotiating power and formulates a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the 
agent. Moreover, we model the bargaining power of the parties in two different ways. In one 
case, we use a Nash bargaining solution. In the other, we introduce the agent’s reservation utility 
to account for his bargaining power, the greater the former the higher the latter. 
The importance of allocating at least some bargaining power to the agent derives from the 
specificities of the contractual relationship that incurs among the parties in a PPP agreement. 
The private company must finance the project, needs highly specific competencies (this reduces 
the number of competitors on the agent side), bears a substantial level of risk and uncertainty. 
Therefore, the agent is likely not to passively accept the decision of the government on the 
variables at stake and will claim an active role in it. 
We choose as a flexibility provision the investment timing as it is valuable both for the 
government and the private firm. Differently, other clauses such as government guarantees 
create value for just one of the parties and are used to convince the other to participate in the 
agreement. It is to be noticed that the public authority and the private entity are negotiating to 
complete a project that would be individually infeasible. Thus, we believe that a form of 
provision meant to create value for both parties is more effective in making the contract 
attractive for the two participants. 
The benchmark model for our work is the one designed by Buso et al. (2020). The authors study 
the optimal design of a PPP considering the moral hazard issue between the public and the 
private party. Also, they consider two agent types, one with negotiating power and one without. 
We expand their framework by explicitly introducing the bargaining power of the parties. The 





Nash Bargaining results 
In the first version of the model, we assume the parties bargain over 𝛼 and the government 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent on the investment triggers and the fixed transfer. 
The results (Proposition 1 and Proposition 2) show that the parties agree to give the entire cash 
flow to the firm. The optimal contract is exactly equal to the one of the benchmark model. This 
happens because the agent, anticipating the principal’s take-it-or-leave-it offer, realizes that his 
payoff will not depend on the level of 𝛼 (it will always be 0 if the project quality is poor and it 
is independent of 𝛼 if the project quality is high). Thus, the principal will decide to implement 
the first best investment timing and pay an informational rent of 𝛷1 if the project is of high 
quality. 
In the second version of the model, we assume 𝛼 = 1 and the parties bargaining over the 
investment triggers 𝑥1, and 𝑥2. The optimal contract (Proposition 3) is exactly equal to the one 
of the benchmark model. The first best timing is achieved, and the principal will pay an 
information rent of 𝛷1 if the project is of high quality. 
The third version of the model relaxes the assumption of 𝛼 = 1, the parties are free to split the 
project cash flow as they prefer. The principal and the agent bargain over 𝛼 and the investment 
triggers 𝑥1, and 𝑥2. A limit of the model is that it does not allow to determine univocally the 
optimal 𝛼 as the bargaining function does not depend on it. The optimal contract (Proposition 
4) mirrors the one of the benchmark model but it is not equal to it. While the achieved first best 
timing is the same in this model and in the benchmark, the optimal transfers coincide only if  
𝛼 = 1. For 𝛼 < 1 the principal will instead have to compensate the agent with a fixed transfer 
higher than the one found in the benchmark model. 
Finally, the fourth version of the model differs from the previous one as we introduce in the 
bargaining problem some constraints over 𝛼. Precisely, we impose a limited liability on the 
government side. The fixed transfer to the firm cannot exceed the investment expenditure 𝐼 
otherwise, the government will find it more convenient to afford the investment cost than to 
pay the private company. Besides, the fixed transfer cannot be negative since it is not realistic 
to imagine that the government will tax the firm that already bears the burden of the investment 
cost. These new constraints were meant to allow finding the optimal value for 𝛼. However, the 
new more complicated bargaining problem does not have an analytical solution but only a 




The introduction of bargaining in the framework of the benchmark model has allowed showing 
how the results by Buso et al. (2020) are solid to the considered bargaining dynamics. However, 
the use of a Nash bargaining solution has shown some limitations. In the first place, it did not 
allow solving for an explicit optimal value of α. Further research is needed to study if 
introducing in the model a nonlinear dependence on 𝛼 would allow obtaining explicitly the 
optimal allocation of the project cash flow.  In the second place, we observe that the optimal 
contracts do not depend on the bargaining power of the parties. In other words, the parameter 
η is never part of the optimal contract. Thus, not allowing the analysis of how the principal’s 
payoff function evolves according to the agent’s bargaining power. To have this efficient 
frontier we expanded the model in another direction modeling the bargaining power in terms of 
the agent’s reservation utility. 
Reservation utility results 












𝛽  the 
principal can induce the agent to exert effort. From that value on she cannot, and she offers to 
the agent the same payoff irrespective of the project quality.  
In Proposition 6 we find the optimal menu of contracts offered to the agent when the principal 
can induce effort. The optimal investment timing is achieved only when the project quality is 
high. However, in that case, the fixed transfer is higher than the first best. In addition to the 





that increases with the agent’s 
reservation utility. On the contrary, when the project quality is low the investment is postponed, 






 that depends positively on 𝑢. The fixed 
transfer is instead reduced by 𝑢
𝑞𝐻(𝛽−1)+1
(𝛽−1)(1−𝑞𝐻)
, the higher the reservation utility the lower the 













When the principal cannot induce effort, she offers to the agent the optimal menu of contracts 
found in Proposition 7. Here, the first best investment timing is never achieved as, regardless 
of the project quality, the investment is postponed by 𝑢
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝛿. Besides, the fixed transfer granted 
to the agent is smaller than the first best of a quantity 
𝑢
𝛽−1
. This result is valid for 𝑢 ∈ [?̂?, 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥] 
where 𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝛽
𝑏(𝜃2)
𝑟
− 𝐼 is the value that brings the transfer 𝜔2
•• down to zero. 
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In conclusion, we studied the shape of 𝜋(𝑢). Both segments are decreasing in 𝑢 and convex. 
Moreover, the function for the principal’s payoff when she does not induce effort is steeper 
than when the effort is exerted. This meaning that, if at 𝑢 = 0 the latter is greater than the 
former, the principal will find it convenient to encourage effort as long as she can do so. This 
is verified when condition 110. is satisfied. 
 Once 𝑢 hits ?̂? there is a jump, the principal cannot induce effort anymore and the principal’s 
payoff is lower. 𝜋(𝑢) goes from equation 103. to equation 105. Notice that theoretically the 
investment can always be postponed. When the transfer to the agents reaches 0 and 𝑢 keeps 
growing the principal can decide to hold 𝜔2
•• at zero and indeterminately postpone the 
investment. However, this will make the chosen trigger diverging dramatically from the first 
best and the principal’s payoff will go asymptotically to zero. 
The model with reservation utility is effective in showing the effect of the agent’s bargaining 
power on the principals’ payoff, and results to be an appropriate complement to the model with 
Nash bargaining. The agent’s bargaining power is showed to have a considerable impact on 





PART A - The optimal investment choice 
Here we will derive the optimal investment rule using the contingent claim analysis. We will 
show how the results presented by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have general validity and can be 
applied in our contribution. 
The goal is to find the value of the option to invest 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) that depends on the cash flow 𝑥𝑡. 
Recall that 𝑥𝑡 follows a geometric Brownian motion 
A.1 𝑑𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑥𝑡𝑑𝐵𝑡, 𝑥0 = 𝑥 
Where 𝛼 is the expected percentage rate of change of the project cash flow 𝑥𝑡,  𝜎 is the positive 
constant volatility, and 𝑑𝐵𝑡 is the increment of a standard Wiener process. 
The contingent claims analysis assumes that the market is sufficiently complete to find an asset 
or a dynamic portfolio of assets (tracking portfolio) that is perfectly correlated with the value 
of the cash flow 𝑥𝑡. The tracking portfolio is assumed to pay no dividends, the return derives 
only from the capital gains. 
Besides 𝛼, the project also generates a positive rate-of-return-shortfall 𝛿 > 0. 𝛿 plays an 
important role in the model as it can be interpreted as the opportunity cost to postpone the 
investment. Suppose 𝑥𝑡 is the price of a share of common stocks, 𝛿 is to be interpreted as the 
dividend paid by the stock. If it is null, a call option on the stock will be held until maturity 
since waiting does not entail any opportunity cost. On the contrary, if the stock pays a dividend, 
the more the investor waits to exercise the call option the more the foregone dividends are. 
Therefore, a positive value of 𝛿 guarantees that in our setting there is an option value to wait. 
When 𝛿 = 0 the investor will find optimal to never invest, no matter how high the NPV of the 
project is. Differently, when 𝛿 goes to infinite the value of the option goes to zero as the 
opportunity cost is so high that the investment will be carried out immediately, in this case, the 
traditional NPV rule applies. 
As anticipated, 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) it the value of the option to invest. Consider now the following portfolio. 
A long position on the option to invest 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) and a short position on n units of the cash flow. 
The value of the portfolio is: 
A.2 𝛹 = 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) − 𝑛𝑥𝑡 
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The portfolio is dynamic as its value changes with 𝑥𝑡. The short position implies that a payment 
of 𝛿𝑛𝑥𝑡 must be done in favor of the counterparty who holds the long position. In an arbitrarily 
small interval of time 𝑑𝑡 the value of the portfolio is: 
A.3 𝑑𝛹 = 𝑑𝐹(𝑥𝑡) − 𝑛𝑑𝑥𝑡 − 𝛿𝑛𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑡 





2𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑡) + 𝑑𝑥𝑡𝐹𝑥(𝑥𝑡) 
Where 𝐹𝑥(𝑥𝑡) and 𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑡) are respectively the first and the second derivative of 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) with 
respect to 𝑥𝑡. 










2𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑡)𝑑𝑡 − 𝛿𝑛𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑡 + (𝐹𝑥(𝑥𝑡) − 𝑛)𝑑𝑥𝑡 
By assuming 𝑛 = 𝐹𝑥(𝑥𝑡) we can get rid of the uncertainty. It follows: 




2𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑡) − 𝛿𝑥𝑡𝐹𝑥(𝑥𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 













2𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑡) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝑥𝑡𝐹𝑥(𝑥𝑡) −  𝑟 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) = 0 
The value of the option to invest 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) must satisfy the second-order differential equation found 
in A.7 Moreover, 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) must also meet the following boundary conditions: 












Condition A.8 follows from the stochastic process A.1 which implies that as 𝑥𝑡 goes to zero, it 
will stay at zero. The number A.9 and number A.10 derive from considerations on the optimal 
investment timing.  𝑥𝑡
♣ is the optimal investment trigger, meaning that when the stochastic 
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process for 𝑥𝑡 hits 𝑥𝑡
♣, it is the optimal moment to carry out the investment. The A.9 is the so-





𝜔 − 𝐼, i.e. the present value of future expected cash flows and the transfer from the government 
minus the investment cost. Notice that equation A.7 is a second-order differential equation but 
to solve it we have three conditions. This is because also the optimal investment trigger 𝑥𝑡
♣ must 
be determined in the solution of the problem and so we need the third boundary condition. The 
A.10 is the “smooth-pasting” condition. It states that 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) must be continuous and smooth at 
the critical exercise point. Otherwise, it is possible to obtain a higher project value exercising 
at a different point.  




+ 𝜔 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑡
♣) =





+ 𝜔 minus the value of the option to invest that is lost upon investment. 
Alternatively, considering it as 𝐹(𝑥𝑡




+ 𝜔 it shows that the optimal investment timing 




+ 𝜔 is equal to the investment expenditure plus the value of 
the option to invest.  




𝜎2𝜁(𝜁 − 1) + 𝜇𝜁 − 𝑟 = 0 
It has two solutions, one positive and one negative. Once considered the boundary conditions 
the only relevant solution is the positive one. It will be called 𝛽. 


















To solve A.7 guess the form for the solution: 
A.13 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) = 𝐴𝑥𝑡
𝛽
 
















Plugging A.15 into A.13 we obtain: 
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Equations A.13-A.15 give the value of the option to invest and the optimal investment rule. The 
most important point is that from 𝛽 > 1,  follows 
𝛽
𝛽−1




+ 𝜔 > 𝐼. The optimal 
investment timing requires the value received from the project to be greater than the investment 
cost. This proves that, when the option to delay the investment exists, the NPV rule is wrong 




+ 𝜔 and the investment expenditure 
𝐼.  
Now observe the value of the option to invest when 𝑥𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
♣. If who holds the investment 
opportunity decide to exercise earlier than 𝑥𝑡
♣ the payoff will be what she would have obtained 




+ 𝜔 − 𝐼), discounted back at the moment she 





must be interpreted as a discount 
factor. Indeed, observe that if the investment is carried out at the optimal investment timing, 
i.e. 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡





 goes to 1. Also, the smaller 𝑥𝑡 the higher the discount
26.  
The same value as A.16 can be obtained defining: 
A.17 𝐹(𝑥𝑡) = 𝐸0(𝑒
−𝑟𝜏)[𝑉(𝑥𝑡) − 𝐼 + 𝜔] 
With 
A.18 𝑑𝑥𝑡 = (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑧𝑡 , 𝑥0 = 𝑥 
Where 𝑟 is the risk-free rate, 𝜎 is the positive constant volatility, 𝛿 = 𝑟 − 𝛼 > 0 is the positive 
rate-of-return-shortfall, 𝑑𝑧𝑡 is the increment of a standard Wiener process under a risk-neutral 
measure, 𝜏 is the investment timing defined as 𝜏 = inf (𝑡 > 0 | 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝜏), where 𝑥𝜏 is the level 
of cash flows that triggers the investment and, finally, 𝑉(𝑥𝜏) is the expected discounted value 
of future cash flows defined as: 
















26 See Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, pp. 315-316. 
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By substituting 𝑉(𝑥𝜏) we get: 



























PART B – Proposition proofs 
Proof of proposition 1 





















































 𝐹2 − 𝜉 ≥ 0 
B.4  𝐹1 ≥ 0 
B.5  𝐹2 ≥ 0 
B.6 𝜔1 ≥ 0 













































































. We have that B.10 and thus B.3 are 
always slack. 































B.13  𝐹2 ≥ 0 
B.14 𝜔1 ≥ 0 
B.15 𝜔2 ≥ 0 
The Lagrangian is: 














































+ 𝜔2 − 𝐼) + 𝜆3𝜔1 + 𝜆4𝜔2 
Where the Lagrangian multipliers are 𝜆1, 𝜆2, 𝜆3 and 𝜆4. One for each constraint B.12-B.15. 
The FOC with respect to 𝜔1 gives: 






Equation B.16 is satisfied in three possible cases: 
i. 𝑞𝐻 = 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆3 = 0 
ii. 𝑞𝐻 > 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆3 > 0 
iii. 𝑞𝐻 > 𝜆1 = 0, 𝜆3 > 0 
The FOC with respect to 𝜔2 gives: 






The right-hand side of the equality is strictly positive, so either 𝜆2, 𝜆4, or both are positive. 
There are three possible cases: 
a. 𝜆2 = 0, 𝜆4 > 0 
b. 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆4 = 0 
c. 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆4 > 0 






𝛿 [𝑞𝐻 (𝜔1 −
𝑏(𝜃1)
𝑟
) − 𝜆1(𝜔1 − 𝐼)] = 𝑥1[(1 − 𝛼)𝑞𝐻 + 𝛼𝜆1] 












[(1 − 𝑞𝐻) (
𝑏(𝜃2)
𝑟




Given B.16-B.19 the possible solutions are discussed. 
Case ia 
The case is characterized by the following relations: 𝑞𝐻 = 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 = 0, 𝜆3 = 0, 𝜆4 > 0. In 
other words, B.13 and B.14 are slack, while B.12 and B.15 are binding. Solving the 






















































, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
 
Some conditions for having 𝑥1
∗∗, 𝑥2
∗∗, 𝜔1
∗∗ > 0 needs to be imposed. Recall that for having 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵, 
and 𝜔𝑖











. Besides, for guaranteeing the 
positivity of 𝜔𝑖
𝐹𝐵 also 𝛼 >
𝛽−1
𝛽




∗∗ to be positive, also 𝛼 > 1 − 𝑞𝐻 is needed., as well as the slack 
inequations of this case (i.e. B.13, B.14) are satisfied by the solution {𝑥𝑖
∗∗, 𝜔𝑖
∗∗}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). 
Case ib 
The case is characterized by the following relations: 𝑞𝐻 = 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆3 = 0, 𝜆4 = 0. In 
other words, B.14 and B.15 are slack, while B.12 and B.13 are binding. Solving the 




















































From the above-mentioned conditions for the positivity of 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵, and 𝜔𝑖
𝐹𝐵 follows the one of 𝑥1
∗ 
and 𝜔1
∗. For having 𝑥2
∗ positive it is required to have α greater than 𝑞𝐻. Besides, the condition 
for the positivity of 𝜔2









. Finally, it can be easily verified that 
the always slack inequations B.3 and B.4 are satisfied by the solution {𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝜔𝑖
∗}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). 
Case ic 
The case is characterized by the following relations: 𝑞𝐻 = 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆3 = 0, 𝜆4 > 0. In 
other words, B.14 is slack, while B.12, B.13, and B.15 are binding. Solving the maximization 











. However, results from the 
binding inequation B.15 that 𝜔2
𝑖𝑐 = 0. Since  𝜔2
𝑖𝑐 = 0, it is expected 𝑥2
𝑖𝑐 = 𝑥 which is a 
contradiction since, by assumption, 𝑥2
𝑖𝑐 > 𝑥 
Cases iia, iib, iic 
All these cases have in common that 𝑞𝐻 > 𝜆1 > 0 and 𝜆3 > 0. Form this follows that B.12 and 



































Cases iiia, iiib, iiic 
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All these cases have in common that 𝑞𝐻 > 𝜆1 = 0 and 𝜆3 > 0 from which follows 𝜔1
𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. 
Plugging 𝜆1 = 0 and 𝜔1










This generates a contradiction because by assumption, 𝑥1 cannot be negative. It does not make 
sense that the government decides to start the project when the expected cash flow, in the best 
scenario, is negative. 
The optimal solution 




∗∗}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). Choosing 



























as a payoff. A similar expression results if she chooses the latter. Now, refer to the difference 
between the two as ∆𝑅 = 𝑅∗ − 𝑅∗∗. 


























) > 0 
Given a positive ∆𝑅, it can be concluded that the principal will offer {𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝜔𝑖
∗}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2) to the 
agent. 
The same operation can be repeated for the agent. His payoff, when the offered menu of 
contracts is {𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝜔𝑖





















𝐼) − 𝜉. A similar expression results under {𝑥𝑖
∗∗, 𝜔𝑖
∗∗}. Now, refer to the difference between the 
two as ∆𝑉 = 𝑉∗ − 𝑉∗∗. 
















− 𝐼) < 0 
Given a negative ∆𝑉, it can be concluded that the agent prefers the menu of contract 
{𝑥𝑖
∗∗, 𝜔𝑖
∗∗}, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2). 
Proof of proposition 3 















































𝐵 − 𝜉 ≥ 0 
B.36 𝐹1
𝐵 ≥ 0 
B.37 𝐹2
𝐵 ≥ 0 
B.38 𝜔1 ≥ 0 









− 𝜔𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 





















This value for 𝜔1 is to be substituted in the objective function. Moreover, B.35 and B.36 are 
proven to be slack as in the proof of Proposition 1. 










































𝐵 ≥ 0 
B.43 𝜔1 ≥ 0 
B.44 𝜔2 ≥ 0 
the Lagrangian is: 




































− 𝜔2) + 𝜆1 (
𝑥2
𝛿
+ 𝜔2 − 𝐼) + 𝜆2𝜔2 
The FOC with respect to 𝜔2 gives: 
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The right-hand side of Equation B.46 is always positive, so either 𝜆1, 𝜆2, or both are positive. 
There is a total of three cases. 
d. 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 = 0 
e. 𝜆1 = 0, 𝜆2 > 0 
f. 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 > 0 
Case e. and f. can be ruled out. Form the binding inequality B.44 it follows that 𝜔2 = 0. Since 
𝜔2 = 0, it is expected that 𝑥2 = 𝑥 which is a contradiction, by assumption, 𝑥2 > 0. 



















The always slack inequalities B.35 and B.36 are easily verified. 
Bargaining over 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 


























































































) , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
Once obtained the optimal values for 𝑥1
◽ and 𝑥2
◽ they can be substituted back into B.47 and 
























, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
These results coincide with the ones obtained by Buso et al. (2020) in the model with no 
negotiating power. 
Proof of proposition 4 







































𝐹2 − 𝜉 ≥ 0 
B.58 𝐹1 ≥ 0 
B.59 𝐹2 ≥ 0 
B.60 𝜔1 ≥ 0 










, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 





















As above, proving B.57 and B.58 to be always slack and substituting B.62 in B.55 the reduced 












































B.64 𝐹2 ≥ 0 
B.65 𝜔1 ≥ 0 




The Lagrangian is: 







































) + 𝜆1 (
𝛼𝑥2
𝛿
+ 𝜔2 − 𝐼) + 𝜆2𝜔2 
The FOC with respect to 𝜔2 gives: 






The right-hand side of Equation B.68 is always positive, so either 𝜆1, 𝜆2, or both are positive. 
There is a total of three cases. 
g. 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 = 0 
h. 𝜆1 = 0, 𝜆2 > 0 
i. 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 > 0 
As above, case h. and i. can be ruled out. Form the binding inequality B.66 it follows that 
𝜔2 = 0. Since 𝜔2 = 0, it is expected that 𝑥2 = 𝑥 which is a contradiction, by assumption, 
𝑥2 > 0. 



















The always slack inequalities B.57 and B.58 are easily verified and both 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 are non-
negative. 
Bargaining over 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and α 


































































































) , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
Once obtained the optimal values for 𝑥1
⋆ and 𝑥2
⋆ they can be substituted back into B.69 and 






















, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
Proof of Proposition 5 

































































The Lagrangian is: 











− 𝐼) − 𝑞𝐻 (
𝜉
∆𝑞












(1 − 𝜂)𝑙𝑛 (𝑞𝐿
𝜉
∆𝑞



































































































































− 𝐼) − 𝑞𝐻 (
𝜉
∆𝑞












the argument of the first logarithm in B.81. 
From the equality B.84 three cases follow: 
j. 𝜆3 = 0, 𝜆2 = 𝜆1 
k. 𝜆3 > 0, 𝜆2 > 𝜆1, 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆1 > 0 
l. 𝜆1 = 0, 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆3 > 0 
Under case j. the problem goes back to the unconstrained one. From case k. follows a 
contradiction as 𝐼 goes to zero. Case l. needs to be studied. Considering only B.79 and B.80 as 
binding we have the following solution: 
B.88 𝑥1
𝐹𝐵 − 𝑥1 =
1−𝑞𝐻
𝑞𝐻






𝐹𝐵 − 𝑥2) 
Alternatively, 
B.89 𝑥2
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